260 A.3d 652
D.C.2021Background
- At ~2:20 a.m. on Dec. 20, 2017, MPD Officers Rose and Bonds heard several gunshots and loud commotion from an alley in a NE D.C. residential area. ShotSpotter reported four shots near 312 Division Avenue (within ~25 meters).
- Officers arrived at the alley 20 seconds later and drove down it; 30 seconds after the shots they encountered appellant walking in the alley near the ShotSpotter locus. Streets were otherwise deserted.
- Officers ordered appellant to the ground; as he was being restrained three women appeared and one angrily confronted appellant (but did not accuse him of a crime).
- A pat-down revealed a .380-caliber bullet in appellant’s back pocket; officers later found a .380 handgun in nearby grass and a magazine in his jacket. Appellant was arrested and charged with unlawful firearm/ammunition offenses.
- Appellant moved to suppress, arguing the initial stop and frisk lacked reasonable, particularized suspicion; the trial court denied the motion, citing geographic/temporal proximity, lateness of hour, and appellant’s lone presence. He appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers had reasonable, particularized suspicion to stop appellant moments after gunshots | Mere presence near shooting 30 seconds later is insufficient; no description of shooter; other people were present | Officers heard shots and commotion, ShotSpotter localized shots to the alley, officers arrived within 30 seconds and found appellant at the locus at an unusual hour | Stop justified: immediacy, location, ShotSpotter, and atypical lone presence created reasonable suspicion |
| Whether post-stop developments (women’s behavior; ShotSpotter movement/speed) dispelled suspicion before frisk | Women’s arrival and ShotSpotter speed showing shots moving east indicated appellant was not shooter | Woman’s anger did not exculpate appellant; ShotSpotter speed was ambiguous and not inconsistent with appellant being involved; officers had no contrary evidence | Subsequent events did not dispel reasonable suspicion |
| Whether frisk was permissible as a protective search for weapons | No articulable basis to suspect appellant was armed and dangerous | Reasonable to suspect someone who had just fired multiple shots was armed and dangerous | Frisk justified for officer safety |
| Whether evidence seized as fruit of stop should be suppressed | If stop/frisk unlawful, physical evidence must be suppressed | Stop/frisk lawful, so discovered bullet/gun/magazine admissible | Motion to suppress denied; convictions affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (authorizes brief investigatory stops on reasonable suspicion)
- United States v. Jones, 1 F.4th 50 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (short arrival time after a shooting supports suspicion that suspect remained on scene)
- United States v. Delaney, 955 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (no particularized suspicion where officers could not localize shot origin)
- United States v. Turner, 699 A.2d 1125 (D.C. 1997) (reasonable suspicion may validly focus on a small number of persons)
- In re T.L.L., 729 A.2d 334 (D.C. 1999) (when universe of suspects is small, a description is not always required)
- In re A.S., 614 A.2d 534 (D.C. 1992) (particularity lacking where suspicion extended to many people)
- Armstrong v. United States, 164 A.3d 102 (D.C. 2017) (temporal immediacy supports reasonable suspicion)
- Umanzor v. United States, 803 A.2d 983 (D.C. 2002) (late hour can make presence at scene atypical and support suspicion)
- Williamson v. United States, 607 A.2d 471 (D.C. 1992) (contrasting decision where officer had no basis to suspect the defendant)