363 P.3d 373
Kan.2015Background
- Raymond Fuller was convicted by a jury of rape, aggravated sexual battery, and aggravated burglary; his defense was that the sexual contact was consensual.
- Trial counsel Quentin Pittman conducted a direct examination of Fuller using pointed, cross-examination–style questions that Fuller later said left him humiliated and appeared to join the prosecution.
- After conviction, Fuller filed a pro se motion for new trial; at the hearing Pittman defended his own trial choices and opposed many of Fuller’s pro se assertions, leading to a clear conflict.
- Fuller raised multiple ineffective-assistance claims in a K.S.A. 60-1507 petition; the district court held an evidentiary hearing on three claims (direct exam, motion-for-new-trial advocacy, two jurors) and denied relief.
- The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed; the Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded limited issues for rehearing with conflict-free counsel.
Issues
| Issue | Fuller’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Pittman’s cross‑examination–style direct examination was constitutionally deficient under Strickland | Pittman’s questioning effectively attacked Fuller, was unprepared, and deprived Fuller of advocacy | Questions were a deliberate strategy to ‘‘take away the sting’’ and elicited strong denials; context matters | Not deficient — trial strategy reasonable; performance met constitutional minimum |
| Whether counsel’s conduct on direct exam amounted to a complete denial of counsel (Cronic) or created a conflict (Mickens) | The style transformed counsel into a second prosecutor and denied Fuller representation at a critical stage | No complete denial occurred; counsel remained advocate and had strategic justification | No Cronic violation; no Mickens personal‑interest conflict established for direct exam |
| Whether failure to call a witness to testify that the victim was a "flirt/tease" was ineffective assistance | Witness would impeach victim’s credibility and support consent defense | Testimony would be irrelevant or inadmissible (rape‑shield rationale and lack of materiality) | Not ineffective — proposed testimony inadmissible/irrelevant; no prejudice shown |
| Whether Pittman’s advocacy against Fuller’s pro se motion for new trial created a conflict requiring appointment of new counsel and relief | Pittman directly opposed Fuller at the critical motion hearing, creating an obvious conflict and effectively leaving Fuller unrepresented | At the time, judge and court relied on counsel’s explanations as strategic; issues should be litigated via 60‑1507 | Conflict existed; remedy: remand limited to hearing on pro se motion issues not already adjudicated adversely, with conflict‑free counsel appointed |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (standard for deficient performance and prejudice)
- United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (U.S. 1984) (presumed prejudice where counsel wholly fails at a critical stage)
- Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (U.S. 2002) (conflict‑of‑interest framework and subcategories)
- State v. Sharkey, 299 Kan. 87 (Kan. 2014) (trial judge must inquire/appoint conflict‑free counsel when conflict apparent at pro se new‑trial hearing)
- Sola‑Morales v. State, 300 Kan. 875 (Kan. 2014) (three‑category structure for ineffective‑assistance claims)
- State v. Galaviz, 296 Kan. 168 (Kan. 2013) (discussion of ineffective assistance categories and standards)
- State v. Gleason, 277 Kan. 624 (Kan. 2004) (rules on concurrent representation and remedying conflicts)
