Fuller v. Benny's Corner Bar & Grill, Inc.
2022 IL App (3d) 180670
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2022Background
- Laura Fuller, as administratrix of Joshua Fuller’s estate, sued four bars under the Dramshop Act alleging Dillon Nolan was served alcohol, became intoxicated, crashed his truck, and Fuller died from injuries.
- Months after filing, Laura sought leave to amend to add individual loss-of-society claims by Fuller’s parents and siblings; the one-year Dramshop filing period had elapsed.
- Trial court denied leave to amend, finding the Dramshop Act’s one-year limit barred adding new plaintiffs/claims and relation-back did not apply; plaintiff’s motion to reconsider was denied.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing there was no evidence Nolan was intoxicated by alcohol at the time of the crash (Nolan had drugs in his system and later pled to drug-related DUI); some witnesses testified Nolan did not appear drunk, others described alcohol consumption and post-crash conduct (no 911 call, moving the vehicle, minimizing injuries).
- Trial court granted summary judgment for the bars; plaintiff appealed the denial of amendment and the grant of summary judgment (plaintiff conceded summary judgment for Trojan’s Corner at trial).
- Appellate court affirmed denial of leave to amend (Dramshop Act’s one-year limit is a condition precedent to recovery) but reversed summary judgment as to Benny’s Corner and Woppers (genuine factual dispute whether Nolan was intoxicated); affirmed summary judgment as to Trojan’s Corner; remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Fuller’s Argument | Defendants’ Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether proposed individual loss-of-society claims could relate back to the original timely estate dramshop complaint under 735 ILCS 5/2-616(b) | Relation-back applies to all statutes; family members were effectively parties (estate) and defendants had notice, so amendment should be allowed | Dramshop Act requires any person claiming loss of society to join within one year; that one-year limit is a condition precedent to recovery and bars adding new plaintiffs after one year | Denied: one-year Dramshop provision is a condition precedent to the right of recovery; relation-back cannot be used because condition precedent was not satisfied; denial of leave to amend affirmed |
| Whether summary judgment was proper because record lacked evidence Nolan was intoxicated by alcohol at the time of the crash | Evidence of multiple drinks at bars plus unusual post-crash behavior and cover-up created a factual dispute on intoxication sufficient to defeat summary judgment | No witness testified Nolan was intoxicated; blood draw showed no alcohol; evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to show intoxication caused the crash | Reversed as to Benny’s Corner and Woppers: factual disputes (consumption + unusual behavior) precluded summary judgment; affirmed for Trojan’s Corner (plaintiff conceded lack of evidence) |
Key Cases Cited
- Demchuk v. Duplancich, 92 Ill.2d 1 (Ill. 1982) (held Dramshop Act’s one-year limitation is a condition precedent to the right of recovery)
- Belleville Toyota v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill.2d 325 (Ill. 2002) (limitations in nonadministrative statutes generally are not jurisdictional; limits on pre-1964 precedent)
- Lowrey v. Malkowski, 20 Ill.2d 280 (Ill. 1960) (discusses Dramshop Act limitation purpose to avoid prolonged liability)
- Kingston v. Turner, 115 Ill.2d 445 (Ill. 1987) (dramshop liability requires that the seller caused the intoxication; de minimis contributions insufficient)
- Nelson v. Araiza, 69 Ill.2d 534 (Ill. 1978) (de minimis alcohol contribution is not sufficient for liability)
- Orlicki v. McCarthy, 4 Ill.2d 342 (Ill. 1954) (legislative purpose behind Dramshop Act’s limitation)