FULGHAM v. STATE, 400 P.3d 775

In 2006 two women were found stabbed to death in a Tulsa apartment; the crime scene yielded blood evidence including on a windowsill and a toilet paper roll.
The case went cold until a CODIS hit in 2009 matched Fulgham’s DNA; police obtained and tested a sample from him while he was incarcerated in Mississippi.
Fulgham was transferred to Oklahoma pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) and was tried in Tulsa County, convicted of two counts of first-degree murder; the jury recommended life without parole on each count, to run consecutively.
The IAD transfer paperwork (Request for Temporary Custody) was filed in July 2013 but the defendant did not raise an IAD objection before trial; the trial court discovered the IAD filing only at sentencing and prompted briefing on waiver.
Approximately 565 days elapsed from Fulgham’s arrival in Oklahoma to trial; the 120-day IAD trial commencement limit was not asserted by Fulgham until after conviction.
Fulgham appealed arguing (1) IAD Article IV(c) was violated and (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the IAD issue pre-trial. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the State violated the IAD by failing to begin trial within 120 days of transfer	Fulgham: trial began well beyond 120 days; dismissal with prejudice required under Article V(c)	State: delays included some good-cause continuances; also Fulgham waived IAD protections by not asserting them before trial	Court: Waiver — Fulgham implicitly waived IAD rights by proceeding to trial without timely objection; IAD protections extend only until commencement of trial, so claim denied
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for not asserting IAD rights pre-trial	Fulgham: counsel’s failure to raise IAD amounted to deficient performance causing prejudice because dismissal was a likely remedy	State: even if performance deficient, cannot show Strickland prejudice — outcome would not reasonably likely have been different; speculative that court would have dismissed	Court: No Strickland prejudice; claim conclusory/speculative and defendant failed to affirmatively prove a reasonable probability of a different outcome

Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716 (IAD is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact and subject to federal construction)
New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110 (a defendant can implicitly waive IAD time limits by acquiescing to treatment inconsistent with them)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two-part ineffective assistance of counsel test: deficient performance and prejudice)
Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (IAD remedies and tolling principles discussed)
Bowie v. State, 816 P.2d 1143 (Okl. Crim. App. discussion of IAD 120-day commencement rule and tolling for good cause)