Fuhrmann v. Staples the Office Superstore East, Inc.
2012 ME 135
| Me. | 2012Background
- Fuhrmann worked for Staples in South Portland and later Biddeford, maintaining a set weekday daytime schedule.
- She transferred to Biddeford in 2006 and was accommodated with her schedule despite a store move and shifting evening demand.
- Fuhrmann reported a coding discrepancy in furniture items donated vs. saleable, which she believed violated tax laws; Auger investigated.
- Steppe, LeMieux, and Rodick allegedly knew or learned of Fuhrmann’s report; timing of her schedule-change discussions is disputed.
- Fuhrmann was asked to shift to nights/weekends; she claimed it conflicted with childcare and resigned on December 28, 2007.
- The Superior Court granted summary judgment to Staples on the whistleblower claim and dismissed the four supervisors; Lopez Fewer remand was issued on the supervisor liability question.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prima facie case under MHRA for WPA claim | Fuhrmann presents causation from protected activity to adverse action. | Staples proffered a legitimate business reason for schedule changes. | Fuhrmann raised a genuine issue of material fact on prima facie elements. |
| Pretext and causation analysis for WPA claim | Temporal proximity and knowledge support a nexus between report and adverse action. | The reasons for scheduling changes were established as business needs. | Material facts disputed; pretext evidence exists; summary judgment vacated for the whistleblower claim. |
| Individual supervisor liability under MHRA/WPA | MHRA’s definition of “employer” includes individual supervisors; thus supervisors can be liable. | No legislative express grant of supervisor liability; statute interpretation favors no individual liability. | Statutes do not provide for individual supervisor liability; judgment affirmed regarding supervisors. |
| Statutory interpretation of 'employer' in MHRA/WPA | Agency has interpreted “employer” to include individual supervisors; that interpretation is reasonable. | Legislature did not expressly include supervisor liability; agency interpretation is inconsistent with the statute. | Court rejects agency interpretation; adopts interpretation that finds no individual supervisor liability. |
Key Cases Cited
- Currie v. Indus. Sec., Inc., 2007 ME 12 (Me. 2007) (prima facie burden in MHRA claims; causal link)
- Daniels v. Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility, 2012 ME 80 (Me. 2012) (three-step burden-shifting framework; prima facie case)
- Stanley v. Hancock Cnty. Comm’rs, 2004 ME 157 (Me. 2004) (temporal proximity and constructive discharge standard)
- DiCentes v. Michaud, 1998 ME 227 (Me. 1998) (MHRA vicarious liability interpretation; agency principles)
- Watt v. UniFirst Carp., 2009 ME 47 (Me. 2009) (agency interpretation of MHRA/WPA applications)
- Adoption of Tobias D., 2012 ME 45 (Me. 2012) (statutory interpretation; reading statutes in light of whole scheme)