Fuentes v. Clarke, 777 S.E.2d 550

Fuentes, a lawful permanent resident, was indicted on grand larceny (a crime involving moral turpitude rendering deportable).
She pled guilty in March 2012 under Rule 3A:8(c)(1)(C), agreeing to a 3-year sentence with all 3 years suspended and recognizing possible deportation.
At the plea hearing, Fuentes stated she read the agreement in Spanish, understood it, discussed it with counsel, and that her plea was voluntary.
In March 2014 Fuentes filed a habeas petition claiming trial counsel failed to advise her of immigration consequences; she learned of removal in June 2012.
The circuit court dismissed the petition, finding counsel adequately advised on immigration consequences and no prejudice; Fuentes appealed.
The Supreme Court standards for ineffective assistance (Strickland) govern the analysis, including that counsel’s performance is examined de novo for legal conclusions and the facts are reviewed for support.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial counsel’s performance was deficient under Strickland in advising about immigration consequences.	Fuentes argues Padilla requires correct deportation advice; counsel’s equivocal warnings and misapprehension of status render advice deficient.	Fuentes’s counsel discussed immigration consequences, advised consulting an immigration attorney, and did not misstate law; no misadvice.	No deficient performance; counsel informed consequences and encouraged immigration counsel.
Whether Fuentes established prejudice from counsel’s advice.	Given the certainty of deportation, advice was prejudicial and a trial would have altered the outcome.	Even with possible deportation, conviction would be the same; removal discretion exists; no reasonable likelihood of different outcome.	Prejudice not established; renewal of trial would not have changed removal risk.
Whether counsel’s belief Fuentes was unlawfully present tainted the advice.	Counsel’s belief led to advice targeted at unlawfully present individuals, undermining effectiveness.	Counsel relied on Fuentes’s own statements; lawful status distinction not essential to advice given.	Not prejudicial; counsel’s status belief did not render advice unreasonable.

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (counsel must inform client of deportation risk of plea)
Akinsade v. United States, 686 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2012) (equivocal advice can be deficient; context matters)
Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115 (2011) (strong presumption of reasonable performance; must show serious errors)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (prejudice prong requires showing would have rejected plea and gone to trial)
Ryland v. Manor Care, Inc., 266 Va. 503 (2003) (deference to factual findings; mixed question of law and fact)
Dominguez v. Pruett, 287 Va. 434 (2014) (habeas review; factual findings binding unless plainly wrong)