Fuelberth v. Heartland Heating & Air Conditioning
951 N.W.2d 758
Neb.2020Background
- Troy and Julie Fuelberth hired Heartland Heating & Air Conditioning (via Mike Wiederin) to design, construct, and install an interior in‑floor geothermal system and an exterior icemelt driveway system for a shop; the parties’ agreement was oral but Heartland provided a single written estimate describing the work as a package (zones including “ICE MELT”) and a total price.
- Installation was performed in 2011–2012; the interior system was "partially" working by January 2012, while the exterior system was not operational until Wiederin returned to pour glycol and make it operational between November 1 and 12, 2012.
- The Fuelberths filed suit on November 14, 2016 alleging negligent construction and breach of an implied warranty of workmanlike performance, asserting Heartland’s defective workmanship caused the systems’ failures.
- Heartland moved for summary judgment arguing Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25‑223’s 4‑year limitations period began upon substantial completion (no later than Jan. 2012 for the interior and Nov. 12, 2012 for the exterior), so the November 2016 complaint was untimely as to the interior and (it alleged) untimely as to the exterior.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Heartland; the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed, holding genuine issues of fact existed about whether the contract was divisible or indivisible and whether the project as a whole was substantially complete only on November 12, 2012, which—under § 25‑2221—made the November 14, 2016 complaint timely if the contract was indivisible.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Fuelberth) | Defendant's Argument (Heartland) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the statute of limitations ran separately for the interior and exterior systems or from completion of the whole project (i.e., is the contract divisible?). | The work was a single, package deal; parties agreed to one price for both systems, so contract is indivisible and limitations runs from completion of whole project. | The systems were separate undertakings completed at different times so each gave rise to separate claims and separate limitations periods. | Reversed: genuine factual dispute exists on divisibility; summary judgment improper. |
| Whether there is a genuine issue as to the date of substantial completion for the entire project. | Exterior wasn’t operational until Wiederin’s November 1–12, 2012 visit; a factfinder could find whole project not substantially complete until Nov. 12, 2012. | Both systems were substantially complete by Jan. 2012 (interior) and by Nov. 12, 2012 (exterior), so claims filed Nov. 14, 2016 are time‑barred. | Reversed: reasonable factfinder could conclude substantial completion occurred Nov. 12, 2012; summary judgment improper. |
| Whether the complaint filed Nov. 14, 2016 was timely if limitations began on Nov. 12, 2012. | Under § 25‑2221, the limitations period begins the day after accrual and extends to the same calendar day four years later; because Nov. 12, 2016 was a Saturday, filing on Nov. 14, 2016 is timely. | Calculation shows suit was filed after four years from completion and is untimely. | Held for Fuelberth on timeliness: if accrual was Nov. 12, 2012, filing Nov. 14, 2016 was timely under § 25‑2221. |
Key Cases Cited
- Russell v. Franklin County, 306 Neb. 546 (Neb. 2020) (summary judgment appellate standard and when to affirm)
- Murphy v. Spelts‑Schultz Lumber Co., 240 Neb. 275 (Neb. 1992) (§ 25‑223 governs contractor/design/build defects and warranty claims)
- Adams v. Manchester Park, 291 Neb. 978 (Neb. 2015) (for workmanship/defective construction, § 25‑223 runs from substantial completion)
- Honstein Trucking v. Sandhills Beef, Inc., 209 Neb. 422 (Neb. 1981) (divisibility of contract treated as question of fact)
- Gaspar v. Flott, 209 Neb. 260 (Neb. 1981) (contract divisibility determined from instrument, subject matter, parties’ intent, and circumstances)
- Reichert v. Mulder, 121 Neb. 11 (Neb. 1931) (contract susceptible of division is divisible and severable)
- George P. Rose Sodding & Grading Co. v. Dennis, 195 Neb. 221 (Neb. 1976) (application of § 25‑2221 for computing time and determining last filing day)