Fuelberth v. Heartland Heating & Air Conditioning, 307 Neb. 1002

Troy and Julie Fuelberth hired Heartland to design, construct, and install an interior in-floor geothermal system and an exterior icemelt driveway system for a farm shop; primary Heartland contact was Mike Wiederin.
Heartland provided a written estimate describing the job as multiple "zones," including an "ICE MELT" zone, for a single total price; the parties’ agreement was oral but treated as a package deal by plaintiffs.
Fuelberth testified the interior system was at least partially working by January 2012, while the exterior system was not operational until Wiederin poured glycol and completed start-up work sometime between November 1 and 12, 2012.
The Fuelberths sued on November 14, 2016, alleging negligent construction and breach of implied warranty; they claimed exterior failure around November 15, 2012 and discovered interior failure in summer 2016.
The district court granted Heartland summary judgment, concluding §25-223’s 4-year limitations period began on substantial completion (interior by Jan 2012; exterior by Nov 12, 2012), and that the November 2016 complaint was time-barred.
The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed, finding genuine factual disputes about whether the contract was divisible or indivisible and when the project as a whole was substantially complete, and that the complaint could be timely if accrual occurred Nov 12, 2012.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When does the §25-223 statute of limitations accrue — at substantial completion of each system or of the entire project?	The systems functioned together; the parties agreed to a package, so accrual should await substantial completion of whole project.	Each system was separately complete (interior by Jan 2012; exterior by Nov 12, 2012), so claims accrued earlier and are time-barred.	Whether the contract was divisible is a factual question; a reasonable juror could find the agreement indivisible, so accrual could wait until the whole project was substantially complete.
Were the systems (or project) substantially complete by the dates Heartland asserts, making the complaint untimely?	Exterior was not operational until Wiederin’s November 1–12, 2012 start-up; interior was not fully functioning; thus project completion may be Nov 12, 2012 or later.	Testimony shows interior was substantially complete by Jan 2012 and exterior by Nov 12, 2012, so claims filed Nov 14, 2016 are untimely.	Genuine issues of material fact exist about substantial completion; a factfinder could conclude project was not substantially complete until Nov 12, 2012, and under §25-2221 the Nov 14, 2016 complaint would be timely.

Adams v. Manchester Park, 291 Neb. 978 (2015) (statute of limitations under §25-223 runs from substantial completion when claim is defective workmanship)
Murphy v. Spelts‑Schultz Lumber Co., 240 Neb. 275 (1992) (§25-223 governs negligent construction and breach of warranty claims against contractors)
Honstein Trucking v. Sandhills Beef, Inc., 209 Neb. 422 (1981) (contract divisibility is a question of fact)
Gaspar v. Flott, 209 Neb. 260 (1981) (contract divisibility determined from instrument, subject matter, and parties’ conduct)
Reichert v. Mulder, 121 Neb. 11 (1931) (contract susceptible of division is divisible and severable)
George P. Rose Sodding & Grading Co. v. Dennis, 195 Neb. 221 (1976) (§25-2221 time-computation rule applied to determine timely filing under statute of limitations)