Fryeburg Trust v. Town of Fryeburg, 151 A.3d 933

Fryeburg Academy (a private secondary school) applied for Planning Board permits to use two leased parcels: the "Land Lot" for primarily outdoor teaching (environmental science, PE, conservation, storage) and the "House Lot" for administrative offices (admissions and advancement) .
The Planning Board approved both uses as permitted "secondary school" uses under the Town of Fryeburg Land Use Ordinance; the Trust (neighboring landowner) appealed to the Board of Appeals, which denied the appeals.
The Trust then appealed to Superior Court under M.R. Civ. P. 80B arguing the Planning Board misinterpreted the Ordinance definition of "secondary school." The Superior Court affirmed the Land Lot approval but vacated the House Lot approval.
The Academy and Town cross‑appealed the Superior Court’s vacatur of the House Lot permit; the Trust appealed the affirmance of the Land Lot permit.
The Court of Appeals reviewed de novo the Planning Board’s interpretation of the ordinance and factual determinations for clear error where appropriate; the operative ordinance defined "secondary school" as a "place where courses of study ... are taught" sufficient to meet State compulsory education requirements.

Issue	Trust (Plaintiff) Argument	Academy/Town (Defendant) Argument	Held
Whether the Land Lot’s outdoor classes qualify the lot as a "secondary school" use	Classes on the Land Lot do not constitute complete courses or all required subjects, so the lot is not a "school" under the ordinance	Teaching state‑required subjects (e.g., science, PE) on the Land Lot makes it a place where courses are taught and thus a school use	Held: Land Lot is a permitted secondary school use; ordinancetext does not require all courses or entire courses be taught on each parcel; affirm Planning Board
Whether use of the House Lot for admissions/advancement offices qualifies as part of the "secondary school" use	Administrative offices are not classrooms where courses are taught and therefore fall outside the ordinance’s definition	Administrative functions are integral to the school’s operation and thus part of the school use	Held: House Lot use is integral to the school and falls within the definition; Planning Board’s factual determination not clearly erroneous; Superior Court vacatur reversed and remanded with instruction to affirm

Aydelott v. City of Portland, 990 A.2d 1024 (Me. 2010) (standard for review of local land use decisions)
Jordan v. City of Ellsworth, 828 A.2d 768 (Me. 2003) (classification of proposed land uses presents mixed question)
Wister v. Town of Mt. Desert, 974 A.2d 903 (Me. 2009) (plain‑language ordinance interpretation)
Dickau v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 107 A.3d 621 (Me. 2014) (avoid interpretations that produce absurd or illogical results)
Stewart v. Town of Sedgwick, 797 A.2d 27 (Me. 2002) (consider ordinance purpose and structure)
Goldman v. Town of Lovell, 592 A.2d 165 (Me. 1991) (when factual determinations bear on definition, initial board fact‑finding matters)
Boivin v. Town of Sanford, 588 A.2d 1197 (Me. 1991) (review standard for board factual findings)
Underwood v. City of Presque Isle, 715 A.2d 148 (Me. 1998) (ancillary functions can be integral to a school)
Rossignol v. Me. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 144 A.3d 1175 (Me. 2016) (scope of M.R. Civ. P. 80B appellate review)
Mills v. Town of Eliot, 955 A.2d 258 (Me. 2008) (de novo review of planning board determinations)