Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools
137 S. Ct. 743
| SCOTUS | 2017Background
- E.F., a child with severe cerebral palsy, uses a trained service dog (Wonder) for daily tasks; her elementary school (Ezra Eby) denied the dog’s presence because a one-on-one human aide was provided under E.F.’s IEP.
- The Frys (parents) removed E.F. from that school, homeschooled briefly, filed an OCR complaint alleging Title II/§504 discrimination; OCR found discrimination and the school later invited E.F. back with the dog.
- The Frys enrolled E.F. in a different public school that accepted Wonder and then sued Ezra Eby and its districts in federal court under Title II of the ADA and §504 seeking declaratory relief and money damages for emotional harm.
- The district court dismissed, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that 20 U.S.C. §1415(l) required exhaustion of the IDEA administrative procedures because the alleged harms were "educational" in nature.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the scope of §1415(l)’s exhaustion requirement and vacated and remanded, holding exhaustion is required only when the gravamen of the claim seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §1415(l) requires exhaustion before suing under ADA/§504 | Frys: Their suit alleges discrimination under Title II/§504, not a denial of a FAPE; they seek relief available under those statutes without IDEA exhaustion | School districts: §1415(l) requires exhaustion when the complained-of harms relate to education; the Sixth Circuit standard (educational genesis/effects) was proper | The Court: §1415(l) requires exhaustion only when the gravamen of the suit seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE; artful pleading won't avoid exhaustion |
| How to determine if a suit "seeks relief available under the IDEA" | Frys: Look to the complaint’s substance; this complaint seeks nondiscrimination relief, not to modify an IEP or challenge a FAPE | School districts: Broader test—if harms are educational in genesis/effect, exhaustion applies | The Court: Examine the gravamen (substance) of the complaint; ask whether the core complaint is about denial of an appropriate education |
| What evidentiary clues identify a FAPE-based gravamen | Frys: Their complaint’s labels and requested relief show a nondiscrimination suit | School districts: Educational consequences show IDEA relevance regardless of labels | The Court: Use substantive inquiry; useful clues include whether same claim could be brought in a non-school public setting or by an adult and whether the plaintiff previously pursued IDEA procedures |
| Effect of prior pursuit of IDEA procedures on exhaustion question | Frys: Not determinative; plaintiffs may start IDEA process then reasonably switch | School districts: Prior use of IDEA dispute process suggests the claim concerns a FAPE and supports requiring exhaustion | The Court: Prior invocation of IDEA procedures is relevant evidence that the gravamen may be a FAPE claim and should be considered on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984) (held IDEA precluded non-IDEA claims until Congress enacted the 1986 Act)
- Board of Ed. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982) (defined substantive right to a FAPE as meaningful access tailored to unique needs)
- Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) (described the IEP as the primary vehicle for providing a FAPE)
- School Comm. of Burlington v. Dept. of Ed. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359 (1985) (addressed remedies available under IDEA and when courts may order relief)
- Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (interpreted §504’s accommodation/participation principles)