463 S.W.3d 312
Ark. Ct. App.2015Background
- Donnie Fronterhouse was convicted by a jury of arson and residential burglary for a July 2012 apartment fire; he appealed the convictions and the denial of a new trial.
- Victim Tara Diaz-Ramirez lived in Apt. 202; Fronterhouse had a volatile relationship with her and was known to stay in a field behind the apartments; he was observed near the complex after the fire with cigarettes and a lighter.
- Two fire investigators concluded the fire began in a closet, was incendiary (human-caused), and that the apartment door had been forced open before the fire; no accidental or electrical cause was identified.
- Tara testified about Fronterhouse’s threats and post-fire messages; the defense argued an alternative theory that neighbor Tiffany Byers — who had drug-related convictions — started the fire to frame Fronterhouse.
- At trial defense counsel attempted to impeach Tiffany with two 2006 misdemeanor convictions (improper use of registration/fictitious tags and criminal impersonation); the trial court excluded those convictions under Rule 609.
- The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial based on the exclusion of the impeachment evidence, addressed sufficiency of the evidence and rejected the claim that the trial court erred by refusing a common-law presumption instruction; juror-misconduct claims were deemed moot.
Issues
| Issue | Fronterhouse's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of the evidence for arson and residential burglary | Evidence was circumstantial and consistent with accidental fire or that Tiffany framed him; experts only ruled out causes, not identify ignition source | Evidence (expert conclusions, forced entry, witness testimony, messages) was sufficient and reasonable minds could convict | Convictions supported by substantial evidence; sufficiency challenge denied |
| Excluding impeachment evidence (Rule 609) | Trial court erred excluding Tiffany’s two misdemeanor convictions because the statutes involve dishonesty/false statement and are always admissible for impeachment | Court required proponent to show underlying facts for convictions; State argued possible harmlessness or cumulative nature of error | Exclusion was erroneous and not harmless; reversal and remand for new trial due to improper exclusion |
| Refusal to give common-law presumption against arson instruction | Jury should have been instructed that unexplained fires presumptively accidental and State must overcome that presumption beyond reasonable doubt | Model arson instruction required proof beyond reasonable doubt that defendant intentionally started the fire; thus presumption instruction unnecessary | No error in refusing proffered presumption instructions; model instruction sufficiently covered issue |
| Alleged juror misconduct (misstatements in questionnaire/voir dire) | Juror’s false answers denied impartial jury and due process | Matter is moot on remand; issue may not recur | Court declined to address because issue moot following reversal/remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. State, 198 Ark. 871 (1939) (articulated common-law presumption that unexplained fires are accidental)
- Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Regions Bank Trust Dep’t, 347 Ark. 826 (2002) (convictions involving dishonesty/false statements are peculiarly probative and admissible under Rule 609)
- West v. State, 27 Ark. App. 49 (1989) (underlying facts may be needed to determine whether a prior conviction involved dishonesty when statute encompasses multiple means)
- Sullivan v. State, 2012 Ark. 74 (2012) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence; appellate court views evidence in light most favorable to the State)