Fritts v. State, 2013 Ark. 505

Appellant Brandon Fritts was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment as a habitual offender.
Victim Jamie Lee Czeck was found murdered in January 2012; crime scene yielded the victim, his cell phone, and shell casings.
Fritts was one of the last people seen with Czeck; initial interviews occurred in January 2012 in Fort Smith, Arkansas, with inconsistent statements.
A murder weapon was located in Oklahoma at the home of Fritts's father after Clawson implicated him.
Fritts sought suppression of statements made in Oklahoma and after being transported to Fort Smith; suppression motions were denied.
On appeal, Fritts argues his January 30, 2012 statement invoked the right to remain silent and any subsequent questioning or weapon display violated Miranda.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was Fritts' January 30, 2012 statement an unequivocal invocation of the right to remain silent?	Fritts, by saying he had already told all he knew, invoked silence.	State contends the statement was not an unequivocal invocation and did not require cessation of questioning.	No unequivocal invocation; suppression denied.
Did showing the murder weapon amount to the functional equivalent of continued questioning after invocation?	Argues that weapon display after invocation violated Miranda.	Concedes but relies on lack of unequivocal invocation to sustain denial.	Court did not reach this issue given no unequivocal invocation.
Was the statement voluntary and admissible, considering the custodial setting and Miranda compliance?	Statement not coerced; voluntary under totality of circumstances.	Invocations and investigative conduct could taint voluntariness.	Voluntariness upheld; suppression denied.

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (defines interrogation including its functional equivalent)
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (custody interrogation cannot proceed after invocation unless initiated by suspect and proper waiver)
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983) (interrogation concepts post-invocation clarified)
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (unambiguous invocation required; ambiguity allowed police to continue questioning)
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (strictly requires unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent)
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (may reinitiate questioning after invoking silence if unambiguous waiver)
Whitaker v. State, 348 Ark. 90 (2002) (unequivocal invocation standards in Arkansas law)
Standridge v. State, 329 Ark. 473 (1997) (clarifies invocation standards for right to counsel vs. silence)
Bowen v. State, 322 Ark. 483 (1995) (ambiguous or non-unequivocal waivers discussed)
Sykes v. State, 2009 Ark. 522 (2009) (statements may not unambiguously indicate invocation)
Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638 (1984) (due process standards for invoking rights)