384 F. Supp. 3d 1284
D. Or.2019Background
- Jennifer Freyd, tenured Psychology professor at Univ. of Oregon since 1987, alleges sex-based pay discrimination versus four male full‑professor colleagues and challenges the university’s retention‑raise practices.
- Freyd is a highly regarded scholar; she is 16th highest paid of 90 in her department and has received minimal federal grant funding compared to the named male comparators.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing the four male comparators performed substantially different work (administration, center directorships, and heavy federal grant management) and that retention raises serve legitimate business needs.
- Freyd asserted claims under the Equal Pay Act, Title VII, Title IX, ORS 652.220, ORS 659A.030, the Oregon Equal Rights Amendment, an equal‑protection claim against individual administrators, and a breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
- The court found the male comparators’ actual duties materially differed from Freyd’s duties (administrative leadership, grant administration, and center direction), Freyd’s disparate‑impact statistics were unreliable given the tiny sample, individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, and Freyd’s contract claim was preempted by the collective bargaining agreement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Freyd proved pay discrimination under ORS 652.220/Equal Pay Act/Title VII/ORS 659A.030/Title IX/Oregon ERA | Freyd: paid less than four male colleagues who do the same job; salary gap shows discrimination | University: comparators perform substantially different work (dept. head, center directors, intensive federal grant management); duties differ in skill/responsibility | Held: Comparators not substantially similar; discrimination claims fail. |
| Whether Freyd proved a disparate‑impact claim based on retention‑raise practice | Freyd: retention raises created a $15k–$25k gap and retained men more often than women | University: sample too small for reliable statistics; retention raises are job‑related and justified by business necessity to retain funded/high‑performing faculty | Held: Statistical evidence insufficient; even if prima facie made, university meets business‑necessity defense. |
| Whether individual administrators (Schill, Sadofsky) are personally liable under Equal Protection | Freyd: they knowingly failed to remedy pay disparity after notice | Defendants: discretionary decisions; no clearly established law prohibiting retention raises or differential pay where duties differ; qualified immunity applies | Held: Qualified immunity; no clearly established violation shown. |
| Whether Freyd’s breach of implied covenant/contract claim survives despite the CBA | Freyd: employment contract and anti‑discrimination policy created contractual rights independent of CBA | University: terms/conditions of employment governed by collective bargaining agreement; CBA preempts individual contract claims | Held: Contract claim is preempted/controlled by the CBA; claim fails. |
Key Cases Cited
- Spaulding v. Univ. of Washington, 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984) (actual job performance, not title, controls comparability)
- Stanley v. Univ. of Southern Cal., 178 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 1999) (EPA prima facie standard)
- Hein v. Oregon College of Educ., 718 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1983) (substantially equal and similarly situated test)
- Gunther v. Washington Cty., 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1980) (comparability standard for Title VII pay claims)
- Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003) (disparate‑impact requires more than discriminatory effect; business necessity defense)
- Stout v. Potter, 276 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2002) (small sample sizes limit statistical proof in disparate‑impact claims)
- Morita v. S. California Permanente Med. Grp., 541 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1976) (statistics from extremely small universe lack predictive value)
- Hardie v. NCAA, 876 F.3d 312 (9th Cir. 2017) (disparate‑impact liability condemns only artificial/arbitrary/unnecessary practices)
- Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (disparate‑impact doctrine origin; business necessity defense)
- Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (qualified immunity requires clearly established law)
- Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (employer may not discriminate on basis of sex)
- Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1987) (CBA preemption of individual contract claims)