Frett v. People
2013 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 25
Supreme Court of The Virgin Is...2013Background
- Victim Gabriel Lemer disappeared Oct. 26, 2008; his car was later chased, crashed, and occupants (John Southwell and Auriel Frett) were arrested. Southwell later led police to Lemer’s body and made inculpatory statements.
- Frett initially waived Miranda, then invoked counsel; hours later, after being told Southwell had implicated him, Frett signed a second waiver and gave a written statement.
- At a pretrial hearing the court suppressed Frett’s Oct. 28, 2008 statement as obtained in violation of his Miranda/counsel rights, but allowed it to be used for impeachment if Frett testified.
- At trial Frett testified and contradicted prior statement; the prosecution obtained admission of the suppressed statement as substantive evidence (it was given to the jury and emphasized in closing).
- Jury convicted Frett of first‑degree murder and related counts; Frett appealed raising, inter alia, that the use of the suppressed statement as substantive evidence was reversible error.
- The Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands held the admission of the suppressed statement as substantive evidence was reversible error and remanded for a new trial; it also addressed recusal and jury‑instruction issues for guidance on retrial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court could admit Frett’s suppressed Oct. 28 statement as substantive evidence | People: 14 V.I.C. § 19 allows prior inconsistent statements to be admitted substantively; statement is consistent with co‑defendant Southwell’s testimony | Frett: Statement was suppressed under Miranda as elicited after invocation of counsel and thus may be used only for impeachment, not substantively | Court: Admission as substantive evidence violated Miranda/exclusionary rule; reversible error because People failed to prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | People: argued admissibility under § 19 (did not effectively argue harmlessness) | Frett: suppression error was prejudicial because statement materially reinforced People’s case and resolved key credibility conflict | Held: People did not carry burden; error not harmless — reversal and remand for new trial |
| Whether trial judge should have recused sua sponte due to prior association with the Public Defender’s Office | Frett: initial Public Defender motion to withdraw created an imputed conflict to then‑Chief (who later presided as judge) warranting recusal | People: no evidence judge obtained confidential case info or had disqualifying participation | Held: No plain error — record insufficient to show a disqualifying conflict or that judge had obtained prejudicial confidential information; Frett may renew claim at retrial with developed record |
| Whether court erred by refusing requested accomplice instruction advising jury to treat cooperating witness testimony with "great care and caution" | Frett: requested Third Circuit model language because Southwell had a plea deal and incentive to lie | People: existing credibility instructions and opportunity for cross‑examination were sufficient | Held: Better practice to give the requested instruction when appropriate; here court’s failure not reversible under facts (defense had full opportunity to impeach) but trial court should give instruction on retrial if requested absent compelling reason to omit it |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (establishes Miranda warnings and right to counsel during custodial interrogation)
- Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be used to impeach inconsistent testimony)
- Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (Fifth Amendment invocation bars substantive use of post‑invocation statements; impeachment use may be allowed)
- Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (harmless‑error review for improperly admitted confessions)
- Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586 (distinguishes constitutional violations that categorically bar trial use from those allowing impeachment use)
- Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (defines "interrogation" under Miranda as express questioning or its functional equivalent)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (requirement that interrogation cease once defendant requests counsel)
- Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (substantive use of certain unlawfully obtained statements invalidates convictions)
- United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131 (reversing conviction where unlawfully obtained evidence was used substantively)