Freeman v. Travelers Companies, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 3d 867

Freeman worked at Travelers as a Nurse Case Manager from ~1998 until her termination on October 3, 2012; she alleges disability (anxiety and depression) and requested accommodations.
Freeman filed an EEOC charge on October 19, 2012 alleging disability discrimination and retaliation; EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on March 26, 2013 with a 90-day deadline.
Instead of suing, Freeman filed a second EEOC charge on May 10, 2013 (checked “continuing action”) alleging, among other things, further retaliation interfering with her job prospects; EEOC issued a second right-to-sue letter on June 3, 2013.
Freeman filed this federal complaint on August 16, 2013 (within 90 days of the second right-to-sue letter) asserting: Count One—failure to accommodate (ADA); Count Two—retaliation by firing; Count Three—post-termination retaliation (interference with job opportunities).
Travelers moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) as time-barred, arguing Freeman failed to sue within 90 days of the first right-to-sue letter and that the second charge is reasonably related to the first charge.
The court treated the allegations as true for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes and considered the attached EEOC documents; it granted dismissal as to Counts One and Two and denied dismissal as to Count Three.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether claims in the first EEOC charge are timely despite Freeman filing suit more than 90 days after the first right-to-sue letter	Freeman contends her second EEOC charge functioned as a request for reconsideration of the first EEOC determination and tolled the 90-day filing period	Travelers contends Freeman failed to file suit within 90 days of the first right-to-sue letter and offers no basis for tolling; thus claims in the first charge are time-barred	Court: First-charge claims (Counts One and Two) are time-barred; Freeman gave no valid basis for tolling or reconsideration that would extend the 90-day period
Whether the post-termination retaliation claim in the second EEOC charge (Count Three) is barred because it is "reasonably related" to the first charge	Freeman argues the second charge raises a distinct, later act of retaliation (interfering with job prospects) and she timely sued after the second right-to-sue letter	Travelers argues the second charge repeats or is reasonably related to the first, and thus Count Three should be barred for the same timeliness reason	Court: Count Three survives. The alleged act arose after the first charge and is a separate, later retaliation; Freeman timely sued within 90 days of the second right-to-sue letter

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (standard for pleading and drawing inferences on motions to dismiss)
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for complaints)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (distinguishing factual allegations from legal conclusions)
Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2009) (notice-pleading regime and focus on merits)
Farrell v. Butler Univ., 421 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2005) (requirement that lawsuit claims be within scope of EEOC charge)
Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857 (7th Cir. 1985) (claims cognizable if like or reasonably related to EEOC charge)
McKenzie v. Illinois Department of Transportation, 92 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996) (retaliation claims can arise after EEOC filing and may not require a second charge)
Vitello v. Liturgy Training Publications, 932 F. Supp. 1093 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (90-day right-to-sue period treated as statute of limitations)