Freeman v. City of Chicago
2017 IL App (1st) 153644
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- On July 3, 2008, a white SUV driven by Rodney Jones fled after being signaled to stop by CPD officers; Jones drove the wrong way on one-way 78th Street at high speed and ran intersections, later turning onto State Street and colliding with Tommye Freeman’s car, causing her death.
- Officer John Kennedy activated lights/siren, made a U-turn, and followed the SUV the wrong way down 78th Street; he later turned onto State Street, lost sight of the SUV, and arrived at the crash scene ~30 seconds after the collision. Kennedy testified he conducted a balancing test and concluded a formal pursuit was prohibited, but nonetheless followed and exceeded the speed limit.
- Plaintiff Sheri Freeman (administrator of decedent’s estate) sued the City under theories of willful and wanton conduct; the City presented no witnesses; plaintiff’s expert (former police chief Andrew Scott) opined the officers were engaged in a pursuit and that their conduct was willful and wanton and causally contributed to the death.
- The jury returned a $2,118,000 verdict for plaintiff and found Officer Kennedy’s conduct showed utter indifference and was a proximate cause; during polling one juror (Juror McConaghy) said she had signed under “duress” and initially disavowed the verdict.
- The court paused, conferred with counsel, sent jurors home overnight, instructed them next day to continue deliberating with clean forms, and after 5–7 minutes the jury again returned the same unanimous verdict; the trial court denied the City’s motion for JNOV or new trial; the appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence required JNOV because Officer Kennedy’s conduct was not proximate cause | Freeman: Kennedy’s willful and wanton following materially contributed to and was a foreseeable cause of the crash | City: The fleeing driver’s independent reckless conduct was the true cause; mere signaling to stop (or brief following) cannot be proximate cause | Court: Denied JNOV — reasonable jurors could find both cause-in-fact and legal foreseeability linking Kennedy’s conduct to the crash |
| Whether the jury verdict was coerced, requiring a new trial | Freeman: Court’s post-poll handling (questions, delay, returning next day) was proper and did not coerce jurors; unanimous reaffirmation in polling supports verdict | City: Juror’s statement of duress, the court’s questioning, sending jury home and later reconvening, and the 5–7 minute final deliberation show coercion | Court: No abuse of discretion — totality of circumstances permitted further deliberations; jurors unanimously affirmed verdict on poll |
Key Cases Cited
- Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494 (Ill. 1967) (standard for JNOV; view evidence in light most favorable to opponent)
- Kellogg, People v., 77 Ill. 2d 524 (Ill. 1979) (requirements and proper scope of jury polling; juror must be able to express dissent and court must either discharge or send jury back)
- Suwanski v. Village of Lombard, 342 Ill. App. 3d 248 (Ill. App. Ct.) (pursuit causation: chasing and fleeing vehicles can be symbiotic; foreseeability of third‑party injury)
- Wade v. City of Chicago, 364 Ill. App. 3d 773 (Ill. App. Ct.) (distinguishable: evidentiary posture where officer was far behind and defendant’s unusual act was unforeseeable)
- Morton v. City of Chicago, 286 Ill. App. 3d 444 (Ill. App. Ct.) (no causal link where officer’s alleged omission did not impact fleeing driver’s dangerous act)