Fredrickson v. Button
426 P.3d 1047
Alaska2018Background
- Unmarried parents Forest Button and Shelley Fredrickson separated in 2006 and informally shared child expenses until Button filed for custody in 2013; custody was settled but child support (retrospective and prospective) was reserved for court determination.
- Superior court found Fredrickson the obligor from Sept 2006–Aug 2010 and applied Rule 90.3 shared-custody calculations from Sept 2010–2013; it included a $300,000 payment Fredrickson received from the Japanese government in connection with her brother’s 2011 tsunami death as income by allocating it in $100,000 annual installments (2011–2013).
- The court imputed income to Fredrickson prospectively (2014 onward) as voluntarily and unreasonably unemployed, using an average of her 2006–2010 AGI; it did not impute income to Button; the court awarded past support and Attorney’s fees to Button under Rule 82.
- On appeal, the court vacated the inclusion of the $300,000 as income because the superior court’s finding that it was paid in three installments was clearly erroneous and the nature of the payment (gift vs settlement vs other) was not found; remanded for determination of nature/treatment of the funds and recalculation of retrospective support.
- The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed use of Rule 90.3 for retrospective calculations (no exception), affirmed imputation to Fredrickson and non-imputation to Button, and vacated the attorney-fee award to Button pending remand.
Issues
| Issue | Fredrickson's Argument | Button's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the $300,000 payment from Japan should be included as income in retrospective support | Payment was a one-time gift/settlement and should not be treated as recurring income | Payment was a settlement (or resource) available for support and may be included in income for retrospective award | Vacated inclusion: trial court clearly erred in finding three annual installments; remand to determine nature of payment and whether/how it counts as income |
| Whether an exception to Rule 90.3 should apply for retrospective calculation | Parties’ waiver, reliance, difficulty proving past expenses, and child’s needs make rigid Rule 90.3 manifestly unjust; commentary provides separate exception | Rule 90.3(c)(1) governs deviations; waiver does not excuse application of the rule | No exception: must prove manifest injustice by clear and convincing evidence; Fredrickson failed to meet that burden |
| Whether income may be imputed to Fredrickson prospectively | Imputing income based on past earnings is improper without proof job still available or ability to earn same | Her voluntary choice to stop working after receiving funds, limited rebuttal evidence, and past earnings support imputation | Affirmed: finding of voluntary (and implied unreasonable) unemployment not clearly erroneous; imputation based on past earnings permissible absent rebuttal |
| Whether income should be imputed to Button for retrospective years | Fredrickson argued Button was capable of much higher earnings and should have imputed income | Court used Button’s actual historical income for retrospective award; imputation for past years would be improper | Affirmed: actual income is used for retrospective awards; court did not err by declining to impute income to Button |
Key Cases Cited
- Nass v. Seaton, 904 P.2d 412 (Alaska 1995) (principal of one-time gifts and inheritances generally should not be treated as income for future support calculations)
- Crayton v. Crayton, 944 P.2d 487 (Alaska 1997) (one-time gifts may be considered in retrospective reimbursement-type child support calculations)
- Sawicki v. Haxby, 186 P.3d 546 (Alaska 2008) (burden-shifting framework for imputing income: primary custodian makes prima facie case; obligor must rebut)
- Reilly v. Northrop, 314 P.3d 1206 (Alaska 2013) (trial court must make findings sufficient to allow appellate review of imputation determinations)
- Cox v. Cox, 855 P.2d 1332 (Alaska 1993) (agreements between parties that lower support than guidelines do not justify deviation without court approval)
- Pugil v. Cogar, 811 P.2d 1062 (Alaska 1991) (imputing income based on prior earnings and earning capacity is permissible where obligor voluntarily changes employment)
- Beaudoin v. Beaudoin, 24 P.3d 523 (Alaska 2001) (an obligor may be voluntarily underemployed even if acting in good faith; totality of circumstances governs reasonableness)