Frederick v. Shinseki
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 13618
Fed. Cir.2012Background
- The Secretary appeals a Veterans Court judgment that Frederick is entitled to DIC benefits under the Veterans Benefits Act of 2003.
- Frederick was married to WWII veteran Fred Hill; Hill died in 1970, making her a surviving spouse eligible for DIC until remarriage in 1986 terminated benefits.
- The 2003 Act, effective January 1, 2004, amended 38 U.S.C. § 103(d)(2)(B) to preserve DIC for surviving spouses who remarry after age 57, and added subsection (e) establishing an application requirement within a one-year window.
- Subsection (e) covers individuals who remarried after 57 before enactment and those who remarried after 57 and before the Act’s effective date, requiring an application within the one-year window beginning on enactment.
- Frederick submitted an informal request in November 2007 to reinstate DIC; the RO denied as untimely, and the Veterans Court held she did not need to file within the window because she sought reinstatement rather than initial entitlement.
- The court must interpret § 101(e) to determine whether Frederick falls within its scope and, if so, the timing and nature of any required application.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 101(e) applies to Frederick’s post-remarriage eligibility. | Frederick contends she is covered by § 101(e) as a surviving spouse who remarried after 57 and would be eligible but for remarriage. | The Secretary argues § 101(e) creates a prospective filing window, applying to both groups (a) and (b). | Yes; § 101(e) applies to Frederick and requires timely filing within the window. |
| What is the correct filing requirement under § 101(e): a window period or an end date? | Frederick argues the end date in December 16, 2004 suffices if she filed before enactment. | The Secretary argues § 101(e) creates a prospective window that must be filed within the one-year period beginning on enactment. | The court adopts a window filing interpretation requiring timely filing within the one-year window. |
| Does § 5110(g) or 38 C.F.R. § 3.114 negate the § 101(e) filing requirement? | Frederick asserts no conflict; the Secretary’s ability to set effective dates does not relieve timely filing under § 101(e). | The Secretary argues readjudication rules and discretionary effective dating can coexist with the filing window. | No; the statutory framework supports applying § 101(e)’s window requirement to new eligibility and does not foreclose timely applications. |
Key Cases Cited
- Adams v. Principi, 256 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (jurisdiction and review standards for Veterans Court decisions)
- Williams v. Principi, 275 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (non-final judgments and statutory interpretation under § 7292(a))
- Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc; statutory interpretation and de novo review of legal questions)
- Prenzler v. Derwinski, 928 F.2d 392 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (statutory interpretation and deference to veterans benefits framework)
- Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (Supreme Court 1994) (interpretive doubt resolved in favor of beneficiaries when statute is remedial)
- Wells v. Principi, 3 Vet.App. 307 (Vet. App. 1992) (Secretary’s obligation to act under new law and when a claimant must file)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (Supreme Court 2005) (interpretive principles regarding statutory text and legislative history)