Frederick Copeland v. Healthcare/Methodist Rehabilitation Hospital LP
W2016-02499-COA-R3-CV
| Tenn. Ct. App. | Aug 10, 2017Background
- Plaintiff Frederick Copeland (age 77) was a HealthSouth inpatient after knee replacement; HealthSouth arranged non-emergency wheelchair-van transport with MedicOne to a follow-up appointment.
- Before transport, Copeland signed a Run Report and a Wheelchair Van Transportation Agreement stating the service was transportation only, that no medical care would be provided, and expressly releasing MedicOne from liability for ordinary negligence (but not gross negligence or willful misconduct).
- After the appointment, Copeland fell while re-entering MedicOne’s van and sued MedicOne (and HealthSouth) for negligence in transporting and assisting him.
- MedicOne moved for summary judgment, arguing the signed exculpatory clause barred recovery for ordinary negligence; Copeland responded that the clause was an unconscionable adhesion contract and/or involved professional services such that Olson v. Molzen applied.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for MedicOne; the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the agreement was an enforceable release of ordinary negligence because the transport was non-professional, non-emergency transportation and not within the narrow Olson exceptions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enforceability of exculpatory clause | Agreement is adhesion or involves professional/medical services so Olson factors bar enforcement | Agreement is for ordinary transportation; driver not a licensed medical professional; plaintiff knowingly released ordinary negligence | Court enforced the clause: not a professional service; Olson inapplicable; release valid to bar ordinary negligence claim |
| Applicability of Olson v. Molzen public-policy test | Olson should apply because transport involved patient and public interest in medical services | Olson limited to professional services subject to licensure; non-emergent wheelchair transport not regulated medical care | Olson factors not applied; transportation falls outside Olson’s narrow professional-service scope |
| Claim that plaintiff lacked meaningful choice (adhesion) | Refusal to sign would have denied transport or forced difficult choice akin to adhesion | No evidence plaintiff had no alternative; services were non-emergent; not a "take-it-or-leave-it" in exigent circumstances | Court found no adhesion contract or coercion; plaintiff could have sought other transport or rescheduled |
| New theories on appeal (three-party contract; regulatory oversight) | MedicOne was effectively an arm of HealthSouth; services regulated by federal/state health laws so release unenforceable | These arguments were not raised below and lack supporting record | Appellate court declined to consider arguments raised first on appeal; deemed waived |
Key Cases Cited
- Empress Health & Beauty Spa, Inc. v. Turner, 503 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1973) (recognizes freedom to contract to limit liability for negligence)
- Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. 1977) (adopts Tunkl factors to invalidate exculpatory clauses affecting public interest)
- Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963) (formulated multi-factor test for public-interest limitation on exculpatory agreements)
- Crawford v. Buckner, 839 S.W.2d 754 (Tenn. 1992) (applies Olson factors to residential lease context; explains Olson is not strictly limited where public interest is implicated)
- Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314 (Tenn. 1996) (defines adhesion contract and discusses unique physician–patient trust considerations)
- Russell v. Bray, 116 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (distinguishes professionals who provide expert analysis from tradespersons performing hands-on tasks)