Frederick Banks v. Mark Hornak, 698 F. App'x 731

Background

Frederick Banks was indicted in the Western District of Pennsylvania and detained pretrial under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) for danger/flight risk; later ordered to undergo competency evaluations under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 and transferred to FMC Butner.
While detained at Butner, Banks filed a petition in the Eastern District of North Carolina titled as an "Indictment Complaint; Petition for a Writ of Mandamus (28 U.S.C. § 1361);" it named FBI, CIA, DOJ officials and sought disclosure of electronic surveillance and that the U.S. Attorney present evidence.
Banks sought in forma pauperis (IFP). The district court denied IFP, concluding Banks fell within 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (the PLRA three-strikes rule) and dismissed the action without prejudice based on that misunderstanding.
Banks appealed the denial of IFP; the question presented to the Fourth Circuit was whether § 1915(g) bars Banks (a pretrial detainee undergoing competency evaluation) from proceeding IFP on appeal and whether his § 1361 mandamus petition is a "civil action" under § 1915(g).
Banks argued he was not a "prisoner" under § 1915(h) because his confinement was civil (under § 4241) and that a § 1361 mandamus petition is not a "civil action" subject to the three-strikes rule.
The Fourth Circuit held Banks was a "prisoner" within § 1915(h) because he was detained pending criminal proceedings under § 3142(e) and that his § 1361 petition sought new, civil-type relief (not relief within the pending criminal case), so it qualifies as a "civil action" for § 1915(g) purposes; therefore IFP on appeal was denied.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Banks)	Defendant's Argument (Government/Respondent)	Held
Whether Banks is a "prisoner" under § 1915(h)	Banks: confinement is civil (competency commitment) so not a "prisoner"	Govt: Banks was detained pretrial under § 3142(e) (danger/flight) and also undergoing § 4241 evaluations, thus within § 1915(h)	Held: Banks was a "prisoner" because he was detained pending criminal charges under § 3142(e) at relevant times
Whether a § 1361 mandamus petition is a "civil action" under § 1915(g)	Banks: § 1361 mandamus (like some mandamus writs) is not a "civil action" and thus not subject to § 1915(g)	Govt: Banks' petition sought new proceedings/relief outside his criminal case and functioned as a civil action subject to § 1915(g)	Held: Court assumed § 1651 and § 1361 petitions are treated similarly and concluded Banks' § 1361 petition sought independent civil relief, so it is a "civil action" for § 1915(g)
Whether petitions arising from criminal proceedings are categorically excluded from PLRA three-strikes	Banks: mandamus seeking relief in criminal proceedings should be exempt	Govt: depends on nature; if petition seeks relief in underlying criminal case, may be exempt; here it did not	Held: If a mandamus seeks relief within existing criminal proceedings it may be exempt, but Banks' petition did not; it sought new proceedings and disclosure, so no exemption
Whether § 1915(g) operates to dismiss claims or only to bar IFP status	Banks: (implicit challenge) § 1915(g) shouldn't be used to dismiss claims outright	Govt/District Court: applied § 1915(g) to deny IFP and dismissed action	Held: § 1915(g) bars prisoners from proceeding IFP after three strikes; it is not itself a merits dismissal provision — but denial of IFP here stands because Banks is a three-striker

Key Cases Cited

Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967) (describing mandamus as an extraordinary remedy to confine inferior courts to lawful jurisdiction)
Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984) (§ 1361 mandamus available only where duty is clear and other remedies exhausted)
Michau v. Charleston County, 434 F.3d 725 (4th Cir. 2006) (interpreting § 1915(h) prisoner definition)
Kalinowski v. Bond, 358 F.3d 978 (7th Cir. 2004) (pretrial detainees are "prisoners" under the PLRA)
Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607 (4th Cir. 2013) (explaining operation of PLRA three-strikes rule)