Frederic Scott Deaver v. Riddhi Desai and Shilpi Pankaj Desai, 14-14-00683-CV

In 2006–2011 Scott Deaver created and maintained a critical website about attorney Riddhi Desai and her daughter Shilpi, alleging misconduct and identity theft and seeking disbarment/criminal charges.
The website contained lengthy blog-style posts, accusations about legal and criminal misconduct, and disparaging/generalized statements about persons of Indian origin and the legal profession.
In 2014 Riddhi and Shilpi sued Deaver for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and civil theft; Deaver moved to dismiss under the Texas Anti‑SLAPP statute (TCPA).
The trial court denied Deaver’s Anti‑SLAPP motion; Deaver appealed interlocutorily. He argued the website communications were covered by the TCPA and also asserted affirmative defenses including statutes of limitations.
The Court of Appeals found the website communications were communications on matters of public concern and thus triggered the TCPA for the defamation and IIED claims, but the civil‑theft claim was not shown to be based on protected conduct.
The court further held Deaver met his burden to prove statutes of limitations barred the defamation and IIED claims as pleaded, requiring dismissal of those claims and remand for further proceedings as to remaining claims and counterclaims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the TCPA applies to statements on Deaver’s website	Desais: statements are not a matter of public concern or are commercially exempt	Deaver: website statements are communications on matters of public concern (free speech)	TCPA applies to defamation and IIED claims based on the website; civil‑theft claim not shown to be covered
Whether commercial‑speech exemption defeats TCPA coverage	Desais: site was used to extort/blackmail (commercial)	Deaver: not primarily engaged in selling goods/services; exemption not proven	Exemption not established; TCPA still applies
Whether Desais met their TCPA burden (prima facie proof)	Desais relied on pleadings and affidavits to show defamation and IIED elements	Deaver: even if prima facie shown, statutes of limitations bar claims	Even assuming prima facie proof, Desais produced no evidence to overcome limitations; claims dismissed
Whether statutes of limitations bar the defamation and IIED claims	Desais: (on rehearing) later postings/letters in 2014 restarted accrual or republished statements	Deaver: website last updated 2011; defamation accrues at publication; IIED accrues earlier based on 2011 contact	Court: limitations ran; later alleged postings would be separate causes of action and do not revive older claims; defamation and IIED (as pleaded) are time‑barred and must be dismissed

Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585 (Tex. 2008) (appellate briefs construed liberally to preserve review)
Rehak Creative Servs., Inc. v. Witt, 404 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013) (TCPA standards and de novo review principles)
In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. 2015) (definition of clear and specific evidence and prima facie under TCPA)
Avila v. Larrea, 394 S.W.3d 646 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012) (communications about a lawyer’s handling of cases constitute matters of public concern)
Velocity Databank, Inc. v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 456 S.W.3d 605 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014) (internet publication accrues defamation cause of action at online publication)
Lippincott v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. 2015) (TCPA can apply to private communications)
Zurita v. Lombana, 322 S.W.3d 463 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010) (IIED statute of limitations)
Hoffman‑La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438 (Tex. 2004) (elements required for IIED claim)
GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1999) (severity standard for emotional distress damages)