Fred Halcomb, Jr. v. Tamarra Ravenell, 992 F.3d 316

Inmate Fred Halcomb (Appellee) had contraband seized from his cell on March 23, 2016; he received two weeks’ advance notice of an adversarial disciplinary hearing on April 14, 2016 and was found guilty.
On April 18, 2016 the Institutional Classification Committee (ICC), including Tamarra Ravenell (Appellant), held a security detention hearing to consider transferring Halcomb to security detention; Halcomb received no advance notice of the hearing’s time or purpose.
The ICC recommended security detention; a senior classification official adopted the recommendation.
Halcomb sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a due process violation from lack of prior notice; Ravenell asserted qualified immunity and moved for summary judgment.
The district court construed the right broadly as a right to “fair notice” (rather than a strict 48-hour rule), found the right clearly established, and denied qualified immunity; Ravenell appealed the denial.
The Fourth Circuit assumed a due process violation but held the right to prior notice of a security detention hearing was not clearly established and reversed, granting qualified immunity.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether failing to provide advance notice of a security detention hearing violated due process	Halcomb: lack of prior notice deprived him of the opportunity to present exculpatory evidence (cellmate claim)	Ravenell: the ICC hearing was administrative/nonadversary; informal notice at the hearing suffices	Court assumed a due process violation for purposes of qualified immunity analysis but did not definitively decide the merits
Proper framing of the right: 48 hours’ notice vs. general right to fair notice	Halcomb: complaint (and DOC policy) alleges entitlement to 48 hours’ notice	Ravenell: right should be defined by complaint/policy as 48 hours or otherwise minimal for administrative process	Court framed the right as the narrower subset of due process: a right to fair notice (not strictly 48 hours)
Whether the right to fair notice of a security detention hearing was clearly established at the time	Halcomb: prior cases (Wilkinson, Incumaa, Williamson) show inmates entitled to procedural protections, so refusal to give prior notice is clearly established	Ravenell: controlling precedent shows administrative segregation requires minimal, informal procedures and does not definitively require prior notice	Court: The law was not clearly established that prior notice was required; qualified immunity applies

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (establishes the procedural due process balancing test)
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (due process is flexible; procedures depend on context)
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (informal, nonadversary review can suffice for administrative segregation)
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (upheld a 48-hour-notice policy but did not make 48 hours constitutionally mandatory)
Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517 (identified when procedural protections for segregation decisions may be inadequate)
Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154 (noted long-term solitary warrants some procedural protection)
Estate of Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong v. Village of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892 (clarifies qualified immunity two-step and right-definition rule)
Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (cautions against defining rights at high levels of generality)
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (pro se pleadings must be liberally construed)
Williams v. Strickland, 917 F.3d 763 (denial of qualified immunity on summary judgment is immediately appealable)