Fraternal Order of Police v. City of York
309 Neb. 359
| Neb. | 2021Background
- Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 31 (FOP) is the exclusive bargaining agent for York Police Dept. officers; collective agreements ran 2014–2018 and 2018–2020.
- Agreements contained a management-rights clause (Art. III, §§3.1–3.2) granting the City/Department authority over hiring, promotion, and adoption of policies, and a promotion provision (Art. XI) requiring competitive testing for vacancies.
- Department employment policies (1995, revised 2010) required employees to reside in York County; personnel rules adopted in 2013 did not include residency. The collective agreements did not expressly mention a residency requirement.
- In late 2018 the Department posted a sergeant promotion and required the promoted candidate to sign a residency agreement to live in York County within 6 months; Officer Doug Headlee applied, was selected, signed the residency agreement, and accepted the promotion.
- FOP repeatedly demanded bargaining over application of the residency requirement to incumbent employees (a mandatory subject). CIR found York’s promotion/residency action was covered by the contract management-rights provisions and dismissed FOP’s prohibited-practice petition; this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a residency requirement for promotion (a mandatory bargaining subject) was "covered by" the collective bargaining agreement | Residency for incumbents is a mandatory subject and was not covered by the agreements; York must bargain | Management-rights clauses (3.2(g) and 3.2(j)) and promotion clause place promotion conditions (including residency) within the Department's authority | Held: Covered — §§3.2(g) and 3.2(j) unambiguously give the Department authority to set promotion conditions, including residency |
| Whether York engaged in improper "direct dealing" with a represented employee by obtaining Headlee's signed residency agreement | York negotiated directly with Headlee and undercut union rights | York was implementing its promotion policy under contract authority, not negotiating over bargaining subjects with the individual | Held: No direct dealing — the Department implemented a covered promotion condition rather than negotiating the mandatory subject with the employee |
| Whether York refused to bargain in good faith / committed prohibited practices under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-824 by imposing residency without bargaining to impasse | York refused to bargain and unilaterally changed terms of employment for incumbents | Because the topic was covered by the agreement, York had no further bargaining obligation | Held: No prohibited practice — no duty to bargain further once subject is covered by the agreement |
| Whether broad management-rights language unlawfully waived bargaining rights or was too vague to preclude bargaining | Broad, nonspecific clauses cannot constitute a clear waiver of mandatory bargaining rights | Clauses are not vague all-inclusive reservations; they are specific enough to place promotion-policy authority with management | Held: Management-rights provisions were sufficiently specific to place promotion/residency within contract coverage; not an unlawful/relaxed-waiver finding |
Key Cases Cited
- Douglas Cty. Health Ctr. Sec. Union v. Douglas Cty., 284 Neb. 109, 817 N.W.2d 250 (2012) (explains threshold contract-coverage analysis for mandatory bargaining subjects)
- Scottsbluff Police Off. Assn. v. City of Scottsbluff, 282 Neb. 676, 805 N.W.2d 320 (2011) (residency requirement affecting incumbents is a mandatory subject)
- Service Employees Intern. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 286 Neb. 755, 839 N.W.2d 290 (2013) (distinguishes management prerogatives from mandatory subjects; working-conditions test)
- Brozek v. Brozek, 292 Neb. 681, 874 N.W.2d 17 (2016) (contract interpretation principles: plain meaning and giving effect to the contract as a whole)
- Federal Bureau of Prisons v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 654 F.3d 91 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (discusses scope/coverage of contract terms and finality of bargaining)
- Wilkes-Barre Hosp. Co., LLC v. N.L.R.B., 857 F.3d 364 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (addresses the ‘‘within the compass’’ test for contract coverage)