Fraternal Order of Police v. City of York
309 Neb. 359
| Neb. | 2021Background
- FOP Lodge 31 is the exclusive bargaining agent for York Police Department officers; parties had CBA terms covering 2014–2018 and 2018–2020.
- Both CBAs contained a management-rights clause (Sections 3.2(g) and 3.2(j)) giving the City/Department authority to set promotion policies and adopt policies not in direct conflict with the CBA; neither CBA mentioned a residency requirement.
- The Department maintained an internal residency policy (since 1995) requiring employees to live in York County; the personnel rules adopted in 2013 did not include a residency requirement.
- Officer Doug Headlee (an incumbent officer living outside York County) applied for and was offered promotion to sergeant in Jan. 2019; he was presented a residency agreement requiring relocation within 6 months as a condition of the promotion and signed it.
- FOP sent demand-to-bargain letters asserting residency-for-promotion is a mandatory subject and that York engaged in "side-dealing"; CIR held a trial, found the promotion condition was covered by the CBAs, dismissed FOP's prohibited-practice petition, and denied fees.
- The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed CIR: the residency condition for Headlee’s promotion was within the compass of the CBAs and therefore York did not commit prohibited practices or engage in unlawful direct dealing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a residency requirement for promotion was “covered by” the CBA (contract-coverage rule) | Residency is a mandatory subject of bargaining affecting incumbents and was not included in the CBA, so York must bargain. | Management-rights provisions give York authority to set promotion conditions, so residency falls within the CBA’s coverage. | The residency condition was within the compass of Sections 3.2(g) and 3.2(j); therefore the subject was covered by the CBA. |
| Whether York unlawfully refused to bargain / made a unilateral change (prohibited practice) | York implemented residency as a condition of promotion without bargaining to impasse. | No duty to bargain further because the issue was covered by the CBA. | No prohibited practice: once a topic is covered by the CBA, employer need not bargain further. |
| Whether York dealt directly with an individual employee (direct dealing / "side-deal") | York negotiated/secured a residency agreement with Headlee, undermining union representation. | York was merely implementing its promotion policy when offering the agreement; not negotiating terms that undercut the CBA. | No direct dealing: presenting and enforcing the promotion condition was implementation of policy covered by the CBA. |
| Whether broad management-rights language improperly relieved York of bargaining obligations (waiver/clarity) | The clauses are too general to amount to a waiver or to cover residency for incumbents. | The text unambiguously reserves promotion-policy authority to York; contract coverage, not waiver, controls. | The clauses were sufficiently specific to place promotion conditions within the CBA’s scope; contract-coverage analysis resolves the issue. |
Key Cases Cited
- Scottsbluff Police Off. Assn. v. City of Scottsbluff, 282 Neb. 676, 805 N.W.2d 320 (2011) (CIR has authority to decide prohibited practices under the Industrial Relations Act)
- Douglas Cty. Health Ctr. Sec. Union v. Douglas Cty., 284 Neb. 109, 817 N.W.2d 250 (2012) (applies the contract-coverage rule for mandatory subjects of bargaining)
- Service Empl. Internat. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 286 Neb. 755, 839 N.W.2d 290 (2013) (conditions of employment that affect incumbents are mandatory bargaining subjects)
- Brozek v. Brozek, 292 Neb. 681, 874 N.W.2d 17 (2016) (contracts with clear terms must be given their plain and ordinary meaning)
- Fed. Bur. of Prisons v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 654 F.3d 91 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (contract coverage need not show exact congruence; topic may be implicitly covered)
- Wilkes-Barre Hosp. Co., LLC v. N.L.R.B., 857 F.3d 364 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (analyzing whether a subject is within the compass of agreement language)
