Fraternal Order of Police v. City of York
309 Neb. 359
Neb.2021Background
- Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 31 (FOP) is the exclusive bargaining agent for York Police Department officers; the parties had a 2014 CBA and a 2019 CBA (retroactive to Oct. 1, 2018). Both CBAs contained management-rights clauses (sections 3.2(g) and 3.2(j)) and a promotion provision (Art. XI §11.1) but did not mention a residency requirement.
- York Police Department maintained internal personnel policies (dating to 1995, revised 2010) that required officers to reside in York County (with a waiver available from the city administrator); those policies were not part of the CBAs and were not adopted by the city council.
- In late 2018 the Department posted a sergeant vacancy and required the promoted candidate to sign a residency agreement committing to move into York County within 6 months. Officer Doug Headlee (an incumbent living outside York County) applied, was selected, signed the residency agreement, and was promoted.
- FOP repeatedly demanded bargaining over applying the residency requirement to incumbent promotions, alleging the requirement is a mandatory bargaining subject and that York engaged in direct dealing and unilateral change. York declined to bargain, asserting the CBAs’ management-rights language covered promotion criteria.
- FOP filed a prohibited-practice petition with the Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR). The CIR dismissed the petition, holding the residency condition was "covered by" the CBAs under the contract-coverage rule and therefore York did not commit prohibited practices. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was applying a residency requirement to an incumbent promotion a mandatory subject of bargaining that York unlawfully implemented without bargaining to impasse? | FOP: residency for incumbents is a condition of employment (mandatory) and York imposed it without bargaining. | York: even if mandatory, the CBAs cover promotion conditions via management-rights clauses, so no further bargaining was required. | Held: The residency condition was within the compass of the CBAs (sections 3.2(g) and 3.2(j)); therefore York did not commit a prohibited practice. |
| Did York’s negotiation/implementation with Headlee constitute unlawful direct dealing with a represented employee? | FOP: York dealt directly with Headlee (an FOP member) to impose terms, undermining collective bargaining. | York: it was implementing existing promotion policy covered by the CBA, not undermining the union. | Held: CIR and court: no unlawful direct dealing; York implemented a promotion condition covered by the CBA. |
| Do broad management-rights provisions amount to a clear and unmistakable waiver of bargaining on residency? | FOP: broad, nonspecific management clauses cannot be read as waiving bargaining over mandatory subjects. | York: the express CBA language granting promotion-policy authority covers residency decisions. | Held: Court拒rejects a relaxed-waiver standard; here the CBA terms were clear enough to show coverage of promotion conditions, so no separate waiver analysis was required. |
| Was the CIR’s contract-coverage analysis consistent with precedent and statutory policy favoring bargaining? | FOP: CIR misapplied precedent and overbroadly construed coverage, undermining bargaining rights. | York: CIR correctly applied the contract-coverage rule, preserving finality of negotiated terms during a contract’s life. | Held: Court affirmed CIR’s application of the contract-coverage rule and emphasized finality of CBAs; the contested topic fell within the agreement’s compass. |
Key Cases Cited
- Douglas Cty. Health Ctr. Sec. Union v. Douglas Cty., 284 Neb. 109, 817 N.W.2d 250 (Neb. 2012) (explains the contract-coverage rule for mandatory bargaining subjects)
- Service Empl. Internat. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 286 Neb. 755, 839 N.W.2d 290 (Neb. 2013) (defines when management prerogatives are not mandatory subjects and when working conditions are bargainable)
- Scottsbluff Police Off. Assn. v. City of Scottsbluff, 282 Neb. 676, 805 N.W.2d 320 (Neb. 2011) (discusses prohibited-practice standards under the Industrial Relations Act)
- Brozek v. Brozek, 292 Neb. 681, 874 N.W.2d 17 (Neb. 2016) (principles of contract interpretation—plain meaning and giving effect to the contract as a whole)
- Fed. Bur. of Prisons v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 654 F.3d 91 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (authoritative discussion on what it means for a subject to be "covered" by an agreement)
- Wilkes-Barre Hosp. Co., LLC v. N.L.R.B., 857 F.3d 364 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (addresses scope-of-coverage inquiry for collective-bargaining agreements)
