Fraternal Order of Police v. Montgomery County
132 A.3d 311
Md.2016Background
- FOP challenged Montgomery County's use of public funds and personnel to advocate for Ballot Question B, which would uphold a law limiting police bargaining; Bill 18-11 amended §33-80(a)(7) to restrict effect bargaining and deleted a special impasse procedure.
- County Executive Leggett and Patrick Lacefield directed and funded the advocacy campaign through the Office of Public Information; campaign included ads, mailings, and other outreach.
- FOP and its members sought declaratory relief and, on some counts, monetary relief; litigation followed a failed referendum petition and a prior related court ruling on signatures.
- The Circuit Court found no standing or laches defenses and declared various actions unlawful, but granted immunity for Counts 7–10; government speech was not recognized as a defense.
- Court of Special Appeals reversed on standing and laches and ruled government speech supported the county's advocacy; the court certified a petition for certiorari.
- The Court of Appeals granted review to resolve whether the county could use public funds and resources for government speech in a ballot-initiative context and to determine proper declaratory relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether FOP has standing to sue. | FOP has a fiduciary duty to its members and a special interest in protecting bargaining rights. | FOP lacks injury distinct from the general public; no standing to challenge county actions. | Yes, FOP has standing. |
| Whether laches barred the suit. | Delay was reasonable; action sought post-election relief and discovery was needed. | Delays risked prejudice and election integrity. | No, laches not barred. |
| Scope of government speech and county authority to advocate for ballot measures. | Government speech doctrine does not authorize official advocacy using public funds to influence elections. | County may engage in government speech within its governance function and authorized powers. | County speech is permissible government speech within its delegated powers. |
| Whether Art. XI-A powers and Montgomery County Charter authorize campaign-like advocacy by county officials. | Art. XI-A grants narrow powers; absence of explicit authorization bars advocacy. | Art. XI-A grants expansive home-rule powers; implicit authority to budget and advocate for governance considerations. | Expanded, not merely explicit, powers permit government speech in this context. |
| Whether Counts 1–6 and Counts 7–10 should be treated differently on declaratory relief and damages. | Counts seek declaratory relief and accountability for alleged unlawful activity. | Counts 7–10 merit immunity or lack basis for monetary relief. | Vacate and remand for proper declaratory judgments; deny monetary relief for Counts 7–10. |
Key Cases Cited
- Teachers Union v. Board of Education, 379 Md. 192 (Md. 2004) (standing where union protected bargaining interests)
- Patterson Park v. Teachers Union, 399 Md. 174 (Md. 2007) (standing based on impact on bargaining power)
- Ritchmount Partnership v. Board, 283 Md. 48 (Md. 1978) (home rule expansive power for local governments)
- Chesapeake Bay Found. v. DCW Dutchship, 439 Md. 588 (Md. 2014) (expanded interpretation of county powers under Art. XI-A)
- Annapolis v. Anne Arundel County, 347 Md. 1 (Md. 1997) (implicit authority to budget and expend for governance under home rule)