Franks v. Bowers
116 So. 3d 1240
Fla.2013Background
- Patient Joseph Franks signed a four‑page pre‑treatment Financial Agreement with Dr. Bowers / North Florida Surgeons that required arbitration of disputes and included a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages.
- Joseph underwent surgery, suffered a lacerated external iliac vein, developed a large retroperitoneal hematoma, remained hospitalized and died; Donna Franks sued for medical malpractice and wrongful death.
- Defendants moved to compel arbitration under the Financial Agreement; trial court granted the motion and the First DCA affirmed.
- Franks sought review, arguing the Agreement violated chapter 766 (the Medical Malpractice Act, MMA) and public policy because it deprived statutory protections and incentives the Legislature required for arbitration (notably a defendant’s concession of liability tied to statutory caps).
- The Florida Supreme Court held the Agreement’s Limitation of Damages clause contravened the MMA and was not severable from the arbitration provision, quashed the DCA decision, and remanded for proceedings under chapter 766.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Financial Agreement’s arbitration clause and $250,000 noneconomic cap violate public policy under chapter 766 | Franks: the Agreement removes statutory incentives (defendant concession of liability and attendant benefits) but still imposes the statutory cap, subverting the MMA’s quid pro quo and public policy | Defendants: the Agreement is a voluntary arbitration agreement; parties may contract around statutory procedures; it does not eliminate essential statutory rights | Held: The cap provision violates the MMA’s public policy because it eliminates the statutory incentive structure (defendant concession) while imposing the cap |
| Whether the Limitation of Damages clause is severable from the Arbitration provision / Agreement | Franks: the limitation is integrated into the arbitration clause and signatures appear adjacent—not severable | Defendants: the damages cap is a separate, severable term that can be excised while enforcing arbitration | Held: Not severable; the damages limitation is part of the arbitration provision and so the order compelling arbitration under that Agreement is void |
| Whether the FAA preempts state law and forbids invalidation of the arbitration agreement | Franks: state law may require arbitration to follow chapter 766 procedures; FAA does not preempt that regime when it permits arbitration under state law | Defendants: FAA preempts state restrictions on enforcement of arbitration agreements | Held: FAA does not preempt the Court’s decision because the ruling does not prohibit arbitration generally and enforces arbitration only consistent with chapter 766; Volt supports state‑law governance of arbitration terms |
| Whether the Agreement is unconscionable (procedural or substantive) | Franks: also argued unconscionability (procedural/substantive) | Defendants: Agreement was conscionable and enforceable | Held: Court did not reach unconscionability after deciding Agreement violates public policy and is nonseverable |
Key Cases Cited
- University of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So.2d 189 (Fla. 1993) (upholding MMA arbitration scheme as providing commensurate benefits and explaining legislative intent)
- St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc. v. Phillipe, 769 So.2d 961 (Fla. 2000) (describing statutory incentives for arbitration and defendant benefits from noneconomic damage cap)
- Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (U.S. 1989) (FAA does not preempt parties’ agreement to have arbitration governed by state law and procedural rules)
- Mullis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 So.2d 229 (Fla. 1971) (contractual provisions that contravene legislative intent and public good are unenforceable)
- Chester v. Doig, 842 So.2d 106 (Fla. 2003) (noting arbitration provisions in chapter 766 were enacted to provide incentives to arbitrate and reduce costs)