Franklin v. State
141 So. 3d 210
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2014Background
- Arthur O’Derrell Franklin committed multiple violent felonies at age 17 in 1983 and was sentenced in 1984 to concurrent, parole-eligible terms totaling 1,000 years; the sentencing court retained jurisdiction over the first one-third (333 1/3 years).
- Franklin filed a pro se rule 3.850 postconviction motion arguing his sentences violate Graham v. Florida because they deny a meaningful opportunity for release based on maturity and rehabilitation.
- The State conceded the trial court’s retention-of-jurisdiction language arguably impaired parole prospects and the trial court struck that retention provision but otherwise denied relief.
- Franklin argued on appeal he remained entitled to resentencing or an evidentiary hearing and appointment of counsel to develop facts showing the parole system could never afford him a presumptive parole release date (PPRD) within his lifetime.
- The circuit court denied further relief, finding Franklin’s allegations legally insufficient and concluding parole eligibility (and periodic parole review) precludes a Graham violation absent allegations of an inherent constitutional defect in the parole process.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Franklin’s 1,000‑year parole‑eligible sentence violates Graham v. Florida | Franklin: Sentence is de facto life without parole because of length and retained jurisdiction; thus no meaningful opportunity for release | State: Sentence remains parole‑eligible; striking retention restores Parole Commission control and periodic review, so Graham is satisfied | Court: Claim legally insufficient; parole eligibility (and periodic review) defeats Graham challenge absent allegations of constitutional defect in parole process |
| Whether trial court erred by denying an evidentiary hearing on Graham claim | Franklin: Needed hearing to develop facts showing parole system cannot create a PPRD within his lifetime | State: Franklin’s motion lacked factual allegations; no hearing required on legally insufficient claim | Court: No hearing required because motion, files, and records conclusively show no relief; prima facie case not made |
| Whether Franklin was entitled to appointment of counsel for postconviction proceedings | Franklin: Counsel necessary to present complex arguments and factual development | State: No counsel needed where motion does not present a colorable legal issue | Court: Appointment discretionary; not required where claim is legally insufficient |
| Whether relief from the Parole Commission’s PPRD calculation must be sought in postconviction relief | Franklin: Challenged PPRD as part of sentence illegality under Graham | State: PPRD-setting errors are challenges to parole actions, not to the underlying sentence | Court: If PPRD or commission abused its discretion, remedy is in proceedings challenging parole decisions, not in 3.850 sentence‑legality claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (prohibits life without parole for juvenile non‑homicide offenders; requires meaningful opportunity for release)
- Freeman v. State, 761 So.2d 1055 (Fla. 2000) (standards for entitlement to evidentiary hearing on postconviction motions)
- Floyd v. State, 87 So.3d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (applying Graham to invalidate de facto life term‑of‑years with no parole eligibility)
- Johnson v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 841 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (review of Parole Commission orders available via extraordinary writ)
- Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653 (U.S. 1974) (parole eligibility is a less punitive scheme than non‑parole‑eligible life)
- Cunningham v. State, 54 So.3d 1045 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (discussing parole eligibility and PPRD in juvenile sentencing context)
- Atwell v. State, 128 So.3d 167 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (parole eligibility can preclude postconviction relief under Graham)
- Caballero, People v., 55 Cal.4th 262 (Cal. 2012) (term‑of‑years effectively producing parole eligibility only after a century can be equivalent to life without parole)