579 S.W.3d 382
Tex. Crim. App.2019Background
- Franklin was convicted of capital murder; the State waived death; trial court imposed mandatory life without parole.
- On appeal Franklin argued for the first time that his age at the time of the offense is an element the State must prove, and because the record contains no evidence of his age he should be eligible for parole.
- The court of appeals treated age as an affirmative/defensive issue and held Franklin forfeited the claim because he did not raise it at trial and the record contains no evidence of his birthdate.
- Franklin invoked Miller v. Alabama (mandatory LWOP cruel for <18) and relied on Garza to argue Miller claims are not forfeitable; he did not, however, ever assert he was under 18 at the time of the crime.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals addressed (1) whether Miller applied/was forfeited here, (2) whether age is an element the State must prove (or a defensive issue the defendant must prove), and (3) whether remand/waiver relief was required.
Issues
| Issue | Franklin's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Miller claim is forfeited | Miller claims are not forfeitable; thus Franklin need not have raised burden-of-proof issue below | Franklin did not assert he was <18; Miller inapplicable; claim about burden was forfeited | Miller does not rescue a claim unless defendant actually claims he was under 18; claim forfeited |
| Whether defendant's age at offense is an element of capital murder that State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt | §12.31(a) makes "18 or older" an aggravating element of punishment and thus must be proved by the State | Age is a punishment-related defensive issue; Penal Code and §8.07(c) treat youth as mitigation/exemption so defendant bears production/burden | Age is a defensive issue; defendant must produce evidence of being <18; State need only disprove if defendant produces evidence |
| Statutory construction: interplay of §12.31 and §8.07(c) | Read in isolation, §12.31 creates conflicting elements; age should be treated as State-proof element | Read together with §8.07(c) and placement in Subchapter C, age operates as mitigation/defensive issue, not an element | §12.31 relates to punishment; §8.07(c) treats youth as defensive; statutes construed to make age defensive, avoiding absurd results |
| Whether Franklin was entitled to a remand or the trial court needed an express waiver/admission/finding of age | Franklin argues Marin-type waiver required; requests remand for jury to decide age/Miller claim | No Miller claim was made below; no evidence produced; sufficiency claim cannot be remedied by remand for new evidence; right was forfeitable here | No remand; no express waiver error; sufficiency fails because defendant produced no evidence of youth |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment)
- Garza v. State, 435 S.W.3d 258 (Miller claim not forfeited when properly asserted)
- Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (intellectually disabled exempt from death penalty)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (facts increasing maximum punishment must be proven to jury)
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (aggravating facts that increase penalty are elements)
- Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (states may place burden on defendant to prove mitigating circumstances)
- Oliva v. State, 548 S.W.3d 518 (textual/statutory construction principles; punishment language marks punishment issues)