Frank Pyrtle, III v. Ashanti Johnson Pyrtle
433 S.W.3d 152
| Tex. App. | 2014Background
- Divorce decree (Apr 21, 2009) awarded Frank Pyrtle exclusive possession of Florida marital residence until sale and required him to pay principal, interest, taxes, and insurance pending sale; net proceeds allocation specified and shortfalls allocated 60% to Pyrtle / 40% to Turner.
- Turner filed an enforcement petition (Nov 21, 2011) alleging Pyrtle ceased mortgage payments after April 2009, refused to cooperate in sale, and the property entered foreclosure; she sought enforcement, money damages, a receiver, and attorney’s fees (including $1,294 paid to Florida counsel).
- A Florida foreclosure judgment for $334,830.19 was entered against both parties soon after Turner filed the petition.
- Trial court awarded Turner: (1) $88,400 plus interest as a money judgment for past-due mortgage payments; (2) $1,294 for Florida foreclosure counsel fees; and (3) $7,000 to Turner’s Texas counsel, taxed as additional child support and subject to wage withholding.
- Pyrtle appealed, arguing lack of subject-matter jurisdiction/ ripeness, impermissible modification of property division, insufficiency and improper classification of the $7,000 attorney-fee award, and insufficiency of evidence for the $1,294 award.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Turner) | Defendant's Argument (Pyrtle) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Subject-matter jurisdiction to convert enforcement into money judgment under Tex. Fam. Code §9.010 | Turner: Family Code preserves enforcement power; §9.010 authorizes money judgment where delivery is inadequate | Pyrtle: Turner seeks economic damages, not enforcement; Family Code §§9.009–9.010 do not apply to real property deficiency | Court: Affirmed jurisdiction; §9.010 applies to failures re real property and permits money judgment when delivery is inadequate |
| 2. Ripeness of claim for deficiency/damages when final deficiency unknown at filing | Turner: Foreclosure proceedings and likely injury were sufficiently developed; foreclosure judgment was imminent/entered | Pyrtle: Amount of deficiency was speculative; injury contingent until sale and deficiency determined | Court: Claim ripe—facts showed likelihood of concrete injury (foreclosure proceedings and later Florida judgment) |
| 3. Whether money judgment improperly modified property division (Tex. Fam. Code §9.007) | Turner: Judgment enforces, not alters, decree; makes Pyrtle bear consequences of his noncompliance | Pyrtle: Court reallocated payment obligations (first $88,400 to Pyrtle), altering decree | Court: No impermissible modification—court validly reduced obligation to money judgment under §9.010 |
| 4. Award of $7,000 to Texas counsel: sufficiency and classification as child support; withholding | Turner: Counsel testified hours and requested $8,000; client testified to $250/hr; no controverting evidence; fees enforceable as child support in enforcement action | Pyrtle: Fees not segregated between child-support enforcement and property enforcement; not properly supported under lodestar; cannot be classified wholly as child support | Court: Classification/segregation objections not preserved; but evidence legally insufficient under lodestar/fee standards to support $7,000 award — reverse and remand for redetermination |
| 5. Award of $1,294 paid to Florida counsel for foreclosure-defense fees | Turner: Fees were part of damages caused by Pyrtle’s breach and recoverable as damages | Pyrtle: No evidence of reasonableness/necessity of Florida fees | Court: Florida-fee award upheld—fees were claimed as element of damages, Turner’s testimony was uncontroverted and award not an abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Dallas v. Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d 537 (Tex. 2010) (subject-matter jurisdiction reviewed de novo)
- Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1998) (ripeness is element of subject-matter jurisdiction)
- DeGroot v. DeGroot, 369 S.W.3d 918 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012) (family-court enforcement authority and §9.010 money-judgment discussion)
- El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. 2012) (lodestar method and required proof to calculate attorney’s fees)
- Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. Nat’l Dev. & Research Corp., 299 S.W.3d 106 (Tex. 2009) (general rule that attorney’s fees are recoverable only by statute or contract; fees as damages in some contexts)
- In re Nalle Plastics Family Ltd. P’ship, 406 S.W.3d 168 (Tex. 2013) (attorney’s fees are not generally compensatory damages, but fees can be part of compensatory damages when underlying claim seeks those fees)