Frank Papera v. Pennsylvania Quarried Blueston, 948 F.3d 607

Frank and Charlotte Papera sued Pennsylvania Quarried Bluestone Co. over quarry contamination and unpaid stone sales in federal court.
The parties reported a settlement and asked the district court for a 60‑day order of dismissal while they finalized a remediation agreement.
The district court entered a two‑sentence May 2016 dismissal order; the docket minute entry noted the case was dismissed “without prejudice” and gave 60 days to move to reinstate if settlement failed.
The parties did not submit a settlement or move to reopen within 60 days; the court administratively closed the case and later told the Paperas it no longer had jurisdiction.
The Paperas refiled a nearly identical complaint in the same district; the same judge treated the defendant’s motion as summary judgment and dismissed the new suit on claim‑preclusion grounds.
The Third Circuit held that the May 2016 order did not clearly state the dismissal was involuntary or with prejudice, so it was a voluntary dismissal without prejudice and could not preclude the second suit.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the May 2016 dismissal precludes the second suit under claim preclusion	Papera: The May 2016 order was a voluntary dismissal without prejudice, so it does not bar refiling	Bluestone: The conditional dismissal and failure to consummate settlement operated as an involuntary/with‑prejudice dismissal that precludes refiling	The court held the order lacked an explicit statement making it involuntary or prejudicial; thus it was a voluntary dismissal without prejudice and did not preclude the second suit
Standard for construing ambiguous dismissals when claim preclusion is asserted	Papera: Ambiguities should be construed against preclusion; presumption favors resolution on merits	Bluestone: The court’s closure and elapsed deadline justified treating the dismissal as preclusive	The Third Circuit adopted a clear‑statement rule: ambiguous dismissals are construed as voluntary and, if a first voluntary dismissal, as without prejudice; only explicit language will convert them to involuntary or with prejudice

Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001) (clarifies that a dismissal "with prejudice" is an adjudication on the merits for claim‑preclusion purposes)
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990) (explains that "without prejudice" dismissals do not operate as adjudications on the merits)
Choice Hotels Int’l v. Goodwin & Boone, 11 F.3d 469 (4th Cir. 1993) (adopts clear‑statement rule: conditional voluntary dismissals are without prejudice unless court explicitly states otherwise)
Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322 (1955) (dismissal with prejudice ordinarily precludes relitigation)
Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2000) (characterizes dismissal with prejudice as a severe, disfavored remedy)
Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2002) (same)
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008) (party asserting preclusion bears burden to prove elements)
Papotto v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 731 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2013) (administrative closure does not equal dismissal; court retains jurisdiction)
United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977 (3d Cir. 1984) (discusses requirement of a "judgment on the merits" for preclusion)