71 F.4th 491
6th Cir.2023Background
- Frank Corridore was convicted in Michigan (2017) of second-degree criminal sexual conduct and sentenced to 19 months–15 years; his sentence included mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring (LEM) and lifetime sex-offender registration (SORA).
- After state appeals failed, Corridore was released from prison and discharged from parole but remained subject to lifetime LEM (GPS ankle bracelet with charging, connectivity, inspection, and felony penalties for noncompliance) and SORA reporting requirements.
- He filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his conviction/sentence; the district court dismissed for lack of habeas jurisdiction because he was not “in custody,” treating LEM and SORA as collateral consequences.
- The district court granted a certificate of appealability limited to whether Corridore was “in custody” for purposes of habeas relief; Corridore appealed.
- The Sixth Circuit (majority) affirmed dismissal, holding LEM and SORA are collateral consequences that do not impose the direct government control or severe physical restraints required for § 2254 custody; Judge Moore dissented, arguing the combined burdens are sufficiently severe to confer custody.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Corridore) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether lifetime electronic monitoring (LEM) alone renders petitioner “in custody” for § 2254 jurisdiction | LEM’s continuous GPS tracking, charging tether, connectivity limits, inspection requirements, and felony penalties impose severe, ongoing restraints on movement and state control | LEM is intrusive but does not physically restrain movement or place petitioner under direct, immediate government control; it is a collateral consequence | Held: No — LEM is a collateral consequence and does not meet the § 2254 custody requirement (majority) |
| Whether SORA alone renders petitioner “in custody” | SORA’s frequent in-person reporting, notification, public dissemination of data, criminal penalties, and lifelong duration are substantial restraints on liberty | SORA is a collateral consequence of conviction (as in prior Sixth Circuit precedent) and does not involve direct governmental control over movement | Held: Forfeited below; even on the merits, SORA alone does not render petitioner in custody under Sixth Circuit precedent (majority) |
| Whether the combination of LEM + SORA together creates custody | The cumulative, mandatory, lifelong restraints of both regimes create direct state control and severe restraints sufficient to confer custody | Two collateral-consequence regimes do not become custody simply by aggregation; neither singly is custodial so the combination is not either | Held: No — the combination does not convert collateral consequences into custody (majority) |
| Procedural preservation / scope of certificate of appealability | Corridore contends his petition preserved the SORA claim (referencing “twin burdens”) and the COA covered the custody claim generally | District court focused on LEM; a one-line mention of SORA in the petition was insufficient to develop the argument below | Held: SORA argument forfeited for failing to develop below; COA was interpreted narrowly (majority) |
Key Cases Cited
- Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) (parole conditions can constitute "in custody")
- Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973) (recognizance/bail conditions may be custodial where state can demand presence at any time)
- Hautzenroeder v. DeWine, 887 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2018) (sex-offender registration obligations are collateral consequences, not custody)
- Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 (1989) (collateral consequences of an expired sentence do not establish custody)
- Piasecki v. Court of Common Pleas, 917 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2019) (Pennsylvania registration requirements found sufficient for custody)
- Munoz v. Smith, 17 F.4th 1237 (9th Cir. 2021) (lifetime electronic monitoring did not constitute custody in that case)
- Does #1–5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016) (SORA resembles punishment for ex post facto analysis; SORA restrictions are substantial)
- Clements v. Florida, 59 F.4th 1204 (11th Cir. 2023) (historical discussion of habeas custody and restraints)
- Lawrence v. 48th Dist. Ct., 560 F.3d 475 (6th Cir. 2009) (probation and community-service conditions can satisfy custody when they impose direct supervision)
- Nowakowski v. New York, 835 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2016) (custody where conditional sentence required physical presence at specified times/locations)