Francisco of the family Santos v. Essex County
1:19-cv-10387
D. Mass.Aug 5, 2019Background
- Plaintiff Francisco Santos (pro se, in forma pauperis) sued Essex County, the Massachusetts Child Support Enforcement Division (IV‑D agency), and three individuals, alleging unlawful seizure of income and other enforcement actions tied to child support.
- Alleged harms: wage garnishment, bank account seizures, repeated driver’s‑license suspensions (loss of employment), denial of passport, and coerced contract with the IV‑D agency.
- Santos claimed constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and criminal statutes 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242; sought voiding of contracts, refunds, reinstatement of license and passport, and fees paid to reinstate license.
- He argued administrative income‑withholding orders issued by the executive‑branch IV‑D agency were void because only judicial warrants or jury judgments can authorize seizures (separation of powers/due process theory).
- Court granted pauper status, reviewed the pleadings under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and dismissed claims for failure to state a claim while giving Santos leave to file an amended complaint within 35 days.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Do 18 U.S.C. §§ 241–242 create a private civil cause of action? | Santos invoked these statutes to remedy alleged unlawful seizures. | Criminal statutes are enforceable only by the United States as prosecutor. | Denied: §§ 241–242 do not provide a private civil right; only the U.S. may prosecute. |
| Can the Commonwealth/its IV‑D agency or county be sued under § 1983? | Santos sued Essex County and the Child Support Enforcement Division as defendants under § 1983. | State agencies and abolished county government are not “persons” under § 1983. | Dismissed as to these entities: a state/agency is not a § 1983 “person”; Essex County not a suable entity. |
| Do administrative income‑withholding orders violate the Due Process Clause because they lack a warrant or jury judgment? | Santos contended seizure via administrative order is unconstitutional; due process requires a warrant or jury judgment. | Due process is context‑dependent; administrative proceedings with notice, hearing rights, and judicial review can satisfy due process; no absolute right to jury or warrant. | Denied: plaintiff did not allege lack of notice or opportunity to be heard; Massachusetts law provides administrative procedures and judicial review; no constitutional defect shown. |
| Are the factual allegations against the named individual defendants sufficient under Rule 8? | Santos named three individuals but alleged no specific acts by them. | Pleading must identify conduct by each defendant to state a § 1983 claim. | Dismissed: complaint fails to allege individual actions or facts sufficient to state a claim; plaintiff may amend. |
Key Cases Cited
- Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (liberal construction of pro se pleadings)
- Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1 (criminal §§ 241–242 are prosecutorial, not civil remedies)
- Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (state and state agencies are not § 1983 “persons")
- Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (due process flexible; hearings may vary by context)
- Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (due process requirements are context‑dependent)
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (procedural due process principles for deprivation of liberty)
- Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (Seventh Amendment jury trial scope does not apply to state administrative proceedings)