Francisco Javier Gonzalez v. State, 04-14-00709-CR

Officer Carmona observed Gonzalez driving away from a house he suspected was a drug house based on neighborhood complaints and observed short-term visitor traffic. Carmona followed Gonzalez, ran the plate, and stopped him for expired registration.
During the stop Carmona ran identification/warrant checks, asked routine travel questions, and perceived Gonzalez as nervous and inconsistent about where he came from and was going. Gonzalez had a prior felony drug arrest.
While Carmona was performing a pat-down, Gonzalez repeatedly reached toward his back pocket and ultimately volunteered consent; he then admitted to having cocaine, which was field-tested and later lab-confirmed.
Gonzalez moved to suppress, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop and that asking destination questions exceeded the scope of the stop; trial court denied suppression and later gave an Article 38.23 instruction.
At trial the court limited cross-examination on attacking the officer’s memory based on the long delay to trial (three years), stating Gonzalez caused the delay; Gonzalez did not make a further offer of proof. Jury convicted; Gonzalez appealed arguing (1) unlawful prolonged detention and (2) improper limitation of cross-examination.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Gonzalez)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether officer had reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop	The stop’s purpose was completed once ID/registration checks were clear and any further questioning (e.g., travel destination) unlawfully prolonged the detention	Officer was still conducting routine stop procedures; during questioning he developed specific articulable facts (leaving suspected drug house, nervousness, inconsistent route, prior drug arrest) giving reasonable suspicion to continue and to obtain consent	Trial court properly denied suppression: prolonged detention was supported by reasonable suspicion and/or occurred while routine stop procedures continued
Whether trial court erred by limiting cross-examination about the effect of time on the officer’s memory	Limitation prevented effective impeachment on witness memory after a three-year delay and thereby violated confrontation/cross-examination rights	Defense failed to preserve a specific objection or offer of proof; the limitation was tailored to prevent Gonzalez from exploiting delay he caused; impeachment on other grounds was permitted and excluded material was cumulative	Not reversible error: issue not preserved and, even if preserved, limitation was within discretion and any error was harmless under Van Arsdall/Shelby factors

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (established reasonable-suspicion framework for investigative stops)
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 232 (traffic stops lawful for vehicular violations; routine questioning allowed)
United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500 (5th Cir.) (itineraries/travel questions fall within traffic-stop scope; reasonable-suspicion analysis fact-intensive)
Vafaiyan v. State, 279 S.W.3d 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (officer may rely on training/experience; conduct innocent in isolation can yield reasonable suspicion in totality)
St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (questions about identity and travel plans are routine; reasonable-suspicion must be analyzed in totality)
Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (reasonable suspicion defined as specific articulable facts plus rational inferences)
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (right to cross-examination not absolute; limiting cross requires harmlessness analysis)
Shelby v. State, 819 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (articulates multi-factor test for harm when cross-examination is limited)
Hamal v. State, 390 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (nervousness plus other factors can support reasonable suspicion)