350 P.3d 615
Utah Ct. App.2015Background
- Francis was hired as national sales manager by National DME in April 2003; dispute concerned whether he was owed commissions (allegedly 4% of Salt Lake branch net profits, excluding oxygen sales). He was terminated in 2004 and later worked for BSN; DME sent a letter asserting an alleged noncompete, which BSN learned about and later terminated Francis.
- Francis filed federal claims (ADA, COBRA, ERISA, FMLA) and related state claims; federal court dismissed federal claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims, so Francis refiled in state court for breach of contract (commissions) and intentional interference with economic relations.
- At trial Francis testified he earned $15,000 commissions in the first quarter, that DME paid $5,300 of that (leaving $9,700), and sought to have the jury extrapolate from first-quarter figures to the whole year; DME disputed the commission arrangement and the extrapolation.
- The jury awarded $24,000 for unpaid commissions; trial court awarded prejudgment interest at 10% under Utah Code §15‑1‑1 and attorney fees under Utah Code §34‑27‑1; DME moved to reduce or set aside verdict and appealed; Francis cross‑appealed the directed verdict dismissal of his interference claim and exclusion of voicemail evidence.
- The Court of Appeals: (1) reversed the damages award above $9,700 and reduced judgment to $9,700; (2) vacated the statutory attorney‑fee award under §34‑27‑1 because Francis’s written demand exceeded the recovery; (3) affirmed exclusion of termination‑circumstances evidence and of the voicemail as hearsay; (4) affirmed application of §15‑1‑1 interest rate; and (5) reversed the directed verdict dismissing Francis’s intentional interference claim and remanded that claim for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for $24,000 damages (extrapolation) | Francis argued jury could extrapolate $15,000 first‑quarter commissions across the year given testimony that company profits/sales were steady. | DME argued no evidence of Salt Lake branch net profits (or oxygen allocation), so any extrapolation was speculative and unsupported. | Court: Evidence supported only the $9,700 actually unpaid for the first quarter; $24,000 award was speculative and reduced to $9,700. |
| Admission of evidence about circumstances of Francis’s termination | Francis sought to keep termination context excluded (he won motion in limine). | DME argued exclusion prejudiced its defense and left jury to assume misconduct by DME. | Court: Trial court did not abuse discretion excluding termination‑circumstances evidence under Utah R. Evid. 403. |
| Attorney fees under Utah Code §34‑27‑1 (wage‑claim statute) | Francis relied on his April 6, 2005 letter as the written demand for unpaid commissions and sought statutory fees. | DME argued statutory prerequisites were not met (demand/amount). | Court: §34‑27‑1 requires demand "not to exceed" the amount later found due; because Francis demanded ~$15,000 but recovered $9,700, fee award vacated. |
| Prejudgment interest rate (Utah Code §15‑1‑1 applicability) | Francis argued §15‑1‑1’s 10% rate applies to choses in action generally, so 10% applies to unpaid commissions. | DME argued §15‑1‑1 applies only to loans/forbearances and not to this contract claim, advocating a lower rate. | Court: Declined to resolve statute’s scope definitively but affirmed trial court’s use of §15‑1‑1 10% rate (no reversible error shown). |
| Directed verdict dismissing intentional interference claim (causation) | Francis argued sufficient circumstantial evidence tied DME’s noncompete letter and communications to BSN’s termination of him. | DME argued plaintiff failed to show causation—no competent evidence linking DME’s communications to BSN’s decision. | Court: Reversed directed verdict; circumstantial evidence could support proximate‑cause inference, so claim must proceed to jury. |
| Admissibility of voicemail (hearsay / state‑of‑mind exception) | Francis sought to testify about voicemail from BSN supervisor linking termination to noncompete, arguing relevance to causation and possibly admissible under state‑of‑mind exception. | DME argued voicemail was inadmissible hearsay and not within an exception. | Court: Affirmed exclusion—voicemail was hearsay offered for truth (why BSN fired him) and did not fit the state‑of‑mind exception (it concerned past motivation, not present/future intent). |
Key Cases Cited
- Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 886 P.2d 48 (Utah 1994) (standard for appellate review of sufficiency of the evidence)
- Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985) (proof of fact of damages requires reasonable probability)
- Price–Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 784 P.2d 475 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (amount of lost profits must be shown with reasonable certainty/approximation)
- Cook Assocs., Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1983) (degree of accuracy required for lost‑profits approximation varies with availability of probative evidence)
- Merino v. Albertsons, Inc., 975 P.2d 467 (Utah 1999) (standard for directed verdict review)
- Eldridge v. Johndrow, 345 P.3d 553 (Utah 2015) (elements of intentional interference with economic relations require proof of causation)