Frances K. Graham v. LNV Corporation, 03-16-00235-CV

In April 2015 Frances K. Graham sued LNV Corporation seeking to block a foreclosure sale of her home and to declare LNV’s lien and power of sale void as time-barred.
Graham alleged LNV accelerated her 2005 note on or before October 3, 2010, and did not foreclose within four years.
LNV foreclosed April 7, 2015 and acquired title; Graham amended to assert wrongful foreclosure and sought declaratory relief.
LNV moved for summary judgment arguing (among other grounds) res judicata from prior suits and that its April 2015 sale was not time-barred because it rescinded acceleration on June 5, 2014.
Graham moved for summary judgment contending the lien and power of sale were void under the four‑year statute because acceleration occurred in October 2010.
The trial court granted LNV’s motion, rendered take‑nothing judgment, and enjoined Graham from filing further suits against LNV related to the property; the court of appeals affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether foreclosure was barred by the 4‑year limitations for enforcing a real‑property lien after acceleration	Graham: note was accelerated on/before Oct. 3, 2010, so limitations expired before Apr. 2015 and the lien/power of sale were void	LNV: it rescinded/abandoned acceleration by letter dated June 5, 2014, restoring original terms and restarting limitations	Held for LNV: rescission letter manifested abandonment; Graham presented no evidence of objection or detrimental reliance, so limitations did not bar foreclosure
Whether Graham’s claims were barred by res judicata (alternate ground)	Graham: prior suits do not preclude current claims	LNV: prior litigation bars Graham’s claims	Held: Court affirmed summary judgment on the limitations ground and did not reach res judicata, but trial court had relied on it as an alternate basis

Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005) (standard of de novo review for summary judgment and when both parties move)
Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. 2001) (acceleration under optional clause accrues cause of action when holder actually exercises option; effective acceleration requires notice of intent and notice of acceleration)
Khan v. GBAK Props., Inc., 371 S.W.3d 347 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (abandonment/rescission of acceleration can restore original contract terms and reset limitations)
G.T. Leach Builders, LLC v. Sapphire V.P., LP, 458 S.W.3d 502 (Tex. 2015) (waiver can be express or implied; waiver doctrine explained)
Ulico Cas. Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 262 S.W.3d 773 (Tex. 2008) (waiver as a question of law where relevant facts undisputed)
Swoboda v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 975 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied) (lender may abandon acceleration by conduct absent borrower’s detrimental reliance or objection)