181 A.3d 495
R.I.2018Background
- On Oct. 28, 2013, Frances Ahearn (age 79) tripped and fell on a sidewalk defect she described as an "oversized crack" near a tree and suffered injuries.
- On Oct. 31, 2013 Ahearn filed a § 45-15-9 notice of claim stating the fall occurred "on Charles Street about 100 feet from the 95 North Exit 23 off ramp."
- The City investigated and could not locate the site because "95 North Exit 23" does not exit onto Charles Street (that exit goes to Route 146/Orms Street).
- Ahearn sued in Superior Court and later (almost two years after the notice) moved to amend her complaint to change the description to "95 South Exit 23."
- The city moved for summary judgment arguing the original notice was defective (pointing to a nonexistent location) and the late amendment could not cure the defect because it was filed after the 60-day statutory period.
- The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the city; the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the notice failed to describe the place of injury in a "reasonably sufficient manner" as required by § 45-15-9(a).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adequacy of § 45-15-9 notice of place of injury | Ahearn: the notice reasonably identified the location and described the defect; the city is sophisticated and could locate the site (e.g., by map). | City: notice pointed to a nonexistent location and therefore failed to identify the actual area where the accident occurred. | Held: Notice defective as a matter of law because it directed the city to a nonexistent location; statute requires reasonably sufficient description. |
| Effect of post-60-day amendment to cure defective notice | Ahearn: amended complaint supplies the correct location and should be considered curative. | City: amendment was filed well after the 60-day statutory notice period and cannot cure the defective original notice. | Held: Post-statutory amendment invalid; amendment filed outside 60 days cannot cure the defective notice. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sola v. Leighton, 45 A.3d 502 (R.I. 2012) (summary judgment standard reviewed de novo)
- Lynch v. Spirit Rent-A-Car, Inc., 965 A.2d 417 (R.I. 2009) (summary judgment principles)
- National Refrigeration, Inc. v. Standen Contracting Co., Inc., 942 A.2d 968 (R.I. 2008) (no genuine issue of material fact standard)
- Carlson v. Town of Smithfield, 723 A.2d 1129 (R.I. 1999) (summary judgment requirements)
- Plunkett v. State, 869 A.2d 1185 (R.I. 2005) (procedural summary judgment authorities)
- Carbone v. Ward, 56 A.3d 442 (R.I. 2012) (notice must describe location in a reasonably sufficient manner)
- Prout v. City of Providence, 996 A.2d 1139 (R.I. 2010) (compliance with § 45-15-9 is a condition precedent)
- Moseley v. Fitzgerald, 773 A.2d 254 (R.I. 2001) (statutory notice requirement cannot be waived)
- Lahaye v. City of Providence, 640 A.2d 978 (R.I. 1994) (notice need not fix exact location but must be reasonably sufficient)
- Pawtucket Transfer Operations, LLC v. City of Pawtucket, 944 A.2d 855 (R.I. 2008) (statutes construed according to plain meaning)