2012 COA 110
Colo. Ct. App.2012Background
- Francen’s license was revoked after a breath test showed .115 BAC following an early-morning traffic stop.
- The stop occurred when a police officer followed Francen’s left-turning vehicle at a traffic light after a passenger briefly stepped out.
- Francen was observed with strong odor of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, and slurred speech; he admitted to drinking several drinks and failed roadside tests.
- The district court reversed the revocation, ruling the initial stop lacked reasonable suspicion and excluding related roadside breath/test evidence.
- The Department of Revenue appealed, arguing the initial contact’s lawfulness is not relevant in a civil license-revocation proceeding.
- The majority held that the initial stop’s legality is not a required element and that the exclusionary rule does not apply in this civil revocation context.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the initial police contact relevant in revocation proceedings? | Francen argues the stop lacked reasonable suspicion and should invalidate the revocation. | Department contends the stop’s lawfulness is irrelevant to revocation. | The initial contact’s legality is not relevant; revocation decisions rely on evidence of intoxication under the statute. |
| Should the exclusionary rule apply to civil license revocation proceedings? | Francen seeks suppression of evidence obtained from an unlawful stop. | Department argues exclusion is inapplicable in civil revocation cases. | Exclusionary rule does not apply in civil license revocation proceedings. |
| How should the statutory framework (42-2-126 and 42-4-1301.1) be interpreted regarding initial stops? | Francen and Peterson-based reasoning imply initial-stop illegality can be challenged. | Department relies on plain statutory text separating revocation from criminal processes; legality of initial stop not required. | Statutes do not implicate the initial stop’s lawfulness; the court construes the text to exclude initial-contact legality from revocation determinations. |
Key Cases Cited
- Peterson v. Tipton, 833 P.2d 830 (Colo.App.1992) (driver may challenge legality of initial stop in revocation proceedings)
- Baldwin v. Huber, 223 P.3d 150 (Colo.App.2009) (exclusionary rule not applied in revocation context (cited in majority))
- Shafron v. Cooke, 190 P.3d 812 (Colo.App.2008) (addressed revocation concerns related to initial contacts)
- Hampe v. Tipton, 899 P.2d 325 (Colo.App.1995) (investigatory stop standards in revocation context)
- Nefzger v. Colo. Dep't of Revenue, 739 P.2d 224 (Colo.1987) (prior framework allowing challenges to legality of initial stop in revocation)
- Wallace v. Dep't of Revenue, 787 P.2d 181 (Colo.App.1989) (early recognition of issues of legality of initial contact in revocation)
- Meyer v. State, 143 P.3d 1181 (Colo.App.2006) (civil revocation review involves de novo legal questions)