FP Willow Ridge Associates, L.P. v. Allen Twp. and Northampton Borough
166 A.3d 487
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | 2017Background
- FP Willow Ridge Associates (Willow Ridge) bought an apartment complex in Allen Township and paid $3,000 per equivalent dwelling unit (EDU) tapping fee for 218 EDUs in March 2011.
- Township set a fixed tapping fee ($3,000/EDU) and defined one residential dwelling as one EDU (260 gpd).
- Willow Ridge disputed the EDU calculation (arguing fewer EDUs were needed for apartments), sent analyses to the Township engineer, and paid under protest while reserving the right to seek a reduction.
- Willow Ridge filed suit (Nov. 2013) asserting: (Count I) declaratory judgment under the Refund Act, (Count II) breach of contract (dismissed), and (Count III) violation of the Municipality Authorities Act (MAA) (dismissed as time-barred).
- Willow Ridge filed an administrative claim for refund with the Township in May 2014 (after the three-year period from payment).
- The trial court granted summary judgment for the Township, concluding Willow Ridge failed to file the written and verified Refund Act claim within three years; this Court affirms but on alternative grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Refund Act’s three-year requirement is a statute of limitations or a notification requirement and whether Willow Ridge timely complied | Willow Ridge: The three-year provision is a notification requirement; filing the complaint within three years sufficed as written notice | Township: A written and verified claim must be filed with the political subdivision before suit; Willow Ridge’s administrative claim was untimely | Court: The provision is a notification requirement; failure to file a written/verified administrative claim within three years does not automatically bar suit where the municipality had notice and was not prejudiced — Willow Ridge’s pre-payment and complaint put Township on notice, so dismissal as time-barred was error |
| Whether Willow Ridge raised a viable independent claim under the Refund Act without a surviving MAA claim establishing illegality of fees | Willow Ridge: Even without the MAA count, the Refund Act can remedy overcharged fees; the complaint suffices to proceed to trial on merits | Township: Willow Ridge’s MAA claim was dismissed and was not preserved on appeal; without proving fees were illegal under some other statute/authority, Refund Act relief cannot be granted | Court: Willow Ridge waived the MAA argument by not preserving it in its Rule 1925(b) statement; because the MAA claim was dismissed and not appealed, Willow Ridge failed to establish the fees were unlawful and therefore cannot obtain a refund; summary judgment for Township is affirmed on that alternate ground |
| Whether summary judgment was improper because material facts (e.g., gallons/EDU) are in dispute | Willow Ridge: There are factual disputes (gallons per unit) requiring trial | Township: Even if factual issues exist, Willow Ridge’s legal theory under the Refund Act depends on an MAA violation, which was waived/dismissed | Court: Material factual disputes do not cure Willow Ridge’s failure to preserve its MAA claim; summary judgment is appropriate on that legal basis |
| Whether a complaint can substitute for the statutory written and verified refund claim required by the Refund Act | Willow Ridge: The complaint filed within three years should constitute the required written/verified claim | Township: Statute requires filing a written and verified claim with the political subdivision as a prerequisite to mandatory administrative action and potential refund | Court: A complaint does not satisfy the Refund Act’s prerequisite claim filing; however, equitable considerations (notice and lack of municipal prejudice) may excuse late administrative filing — here notice existed, but refund relief still fails because plaintiff did not preserve the underlying legal challenge to fee legality |
Key Cases Cited
- Borough of Malvern v. K.R.I. Corp., 570 A.2d 633 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990) (Refund Act’s three-year provision is a notification statute; failure to notify is not an absolute bar absent municipal prejudice)
- City of Philadelphia v. Tax Review Bd. of City of Philadelphia, 901 A.2d 1113 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (same interpretation of local refund-notice provision)
- Skepton v. Borough of Wilson, 755 A.2d 1267 (Pa. 2000) (taxpayer entitled to refund where fees were illegal/grossly disproportionate; Refund Act provides recovery mechanism)
- Commonwealth v. Hill, 16 A.3d 484 (Pa. 2011) (Rule 1925(b) statement is mandatory; issues not raised therein are waived)