Fountain v. State, 139 A.3d 837

Background

Martin E. Fountain was convicted in 2003 of multiple drug offenses and sentenced to an aggregate term at Level V that included two long consecutive cocaine-delivery sentences.
In 2014 the General Assembly amended 11 Del. C. § 3901(d) (House Bill 312) to restore judicial discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for most offenses (with listed serious crimes still requiring consecutive sentences).
Fountain moved in Superior Court to have his two cocaine-delivery sentences declared concurrent under the 2014 amendment; the Superior Court denied relief, finding the amendment prospective only.
Fountain appealed; the Supreme Court appointed amicus curiae, considered the parties’ briefs and oral argument, and reviewed the statutory text and legislative history.
The Court concluded the 2014 Amended Sentencing Act operates prospectively and affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of Fountain’s motion.

Issues

Issue	Fountain's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether the 2014 amendment to 11 Del. C. § 3901(d) applies retroactively to sentences imposed before July 9, 2014	§ 3901(d) is remedial/procedural so it should apply retroactively; judges may reimpose concurrent terms	Statutory amendments operate prospectively absent an express retroactivity provision	The amendment applies only prospectively
Whether the common-law remedial/procedural exception supports retroactive application	The amendment is procedural/remedial and thus fits the exception allowing retroactivity	No express legislative intent to make amendment retroactive; general rule controls	Court declined to rely on the exception and read the statute as prospective
Whether existing procedural mechanisms permit retroactive relief	The amendment’s remedial nature implies judges can reconsider earlier consecutive sentences	Retroactive effect would be hollow because Rule 35(b) limits resentencing motions to 90 days after sentence	Court noted lack of a viable vehicle for broad retroactive relief (Rule 35(b) timing) and found this counsels against retroactivity
Whether legislative silence or failure to provide special retroactivity procedures affects interpretation	Legislative intent toward sentencing reform supports retroactivity	Silence and absence of retroactivity language, notice provisions, or special procedures indicate prospective operation	Court held that silence and lack of express retroactivity or procedures weighs strongly for prospective application

Key Cases Cited

Williams v. State, 756 A.2d 349 (Del. 2000) (statutory construction principle regarding legislative intent)
Hubbard v. Hibbard Brown & Co., 633 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993) (remedial/procedural amendments may apply retroactively if they do not affect substantive rights)
Keller v. Wilson & Co., 190 A. 115 (Del. 1936) (presumption against retrospective operation of statutes)
State v. Barnes, 116 A.3d 883 (Del. 2015) (standard of review for statutory construction in criminal sentencing)
State v. Lewis, 797 A.2d 1198 (Del. 2002) (examples of "extraordinary circumstances" for late Rule 35 relief)