Foster v. United States, 218 A.3d 1142

Foster lived at 1025 13th Street SE in the DCHA "Hopkins Apartments" development and was listed on his mother Monica Wheeler’s lease as a household member.
Officer Charles Roberts issued a DCHA barring notice to Foster after an encounter near 1000 12th Street SE, barring him from "Hopkins One" addresses (1000 12th, 1121 K, 1131 K).
Two days later Officer Anthony Glasgow arrested Foster inside the gates of 1131 K Street SE for violating that barring notice; Foster said he was visiting his mother to deliver a gift.
Mrs. Wheeler’s lease (a DCHA form) identified the premises as the "Development" ("Hopkins Apartments") and expressly granted lessees and listed household members access to common areas, grounds, and facilities associated with all buildings in the development.
The trial court convicted Foster of unlawful entry, crediting security officers’ testimony that Hopkins divided into distinct "Hopkins One" and "Hopkins Two" areas and that the barring notice validly excluded Foster from Hopkins One.
On appeal the court reversed: because the lease (a DCHA document) granted household members access to common areas across the entire development, Foster was an "authorized" person and the barring notice purporting to exclude him from Hopkins One was invalid under 14 DCMR § 9600, so the evidence was insufficient to support unlawful entry.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Government proved Foster lacked lawful authority to be on 1131 K St based on a DCHA barring notice	Foster: as a listed household member on a DCHA lease for "Hopkins Apartments," he had express right to common areas across the development, so a barring notice excluding him from part of the development was invalid	Government: officers testified Hopkins split into legally distinct "Hopkins One" and "Hopkins Two," and the barring notice lawfully excluded Foster from the Hopkins One addresses; tenant roster and officer practice support that division	Reversed. The lease language gave household members access to common areas of the entire development, making Foster "authorized"; the barring notice was therefore invalid and evidence insufficient for unlawful entry

Cherry v. District of Columbia, 164 A.3d 922 (D.C. 2017) (sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard for appellate review)
Duffee v. District of Columbia, 93 A.3d 1273 (D.C. 2014) (appellate review of crime elements and sufficiency de novo)
Cartledge v. United States, 100 A.3d 147 (D.C. 2014) (elements of unlawful entry: entry and lack of lawful authority)
Ortberg v. United States, 81 A.3d 303 (D.C. 2013) (defining unauthorized entry against will of owner or lawful occupant)
Winston v. United States, 106 A.3d 1087 (D.C. 2015) (unlawful-entry conviction premised on a barring order requires proof that the barring was authorized under DCHA regulations)
In re D.F., 70 A.3d 240 (D.C. 2013) (statutory/regulatory interpretation reviewed de novo)
Capital City Mortg. Corp. v. Habana Vill. Art & Folklore, Inc., 747 A.2d 564 (D.C. 2000) (leases construed as contracts under objective-law principles)