Foster v. State
304 Ga. 624
Ga.2018Background
- Victim Kenneth Scott ("Stuntman") cashed his paycheck and met defendant Jerome Foster after their shifts on Aug 16-17, 2012; Foster and accomplice Andrew Ball lured, robbed, beat, and strangled Scott.
- Ball hid in Foster’s car, attacked Scott; Foster allegedly struck Scott with a baseball bat; Scott was later found dead with a canvas belt around his neck and pockets turned inside out.
- Foster admitted being with Scott and Ball the night of the killing and helped burn Scott’s truck; Foster also returned home early, entered through a bedroom window, and had allegedly bloody clothing and a bloody washcloth was found at his home.
- Ball did not testify at trial; witnesses recounted statements Ball had made to them describing the robbery and Foster’s role. Foster represented himself at trial and did not object to admission of that hearsay.
- Foster was convicted of malice murder, robbery by force, and related counts; he appealed solely arguing the accomplice’s statements were not sufficiently corroborated to sustain convictions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of corroboration for accomplice statements | Foster: Ball’s out-of-court statements (conveyed by others) were the only evidence that Foster attacked Scott and therefore insufficiently corroborated under OCGA § 24-14-8 | State: Independent circumstantial evidence (calls, conduct, physical evidence, admissions, burning truck) sufficiently corroborated Ball’s account | Court: Affirmed — independent corroborating evidence (though circumstantial/slight) sufficiently connected Foster to the crime and supported convictions |
| Admissibility/waiver of hearsay from accomplice | Foster argued lack of corroboration; did not preserve objection to hearsay admission at trial | State noted Foster waived hearsay objection by not objecting while representing himself; appellate counsel did not challenge admission | Court: Noted waiver of hearsay objection; proceeded to analyze corroboration and found it adequate |
| Applicability of Threatt standard under new Evidence Code | Foster implied old-law corroboration rule might not apply | State: Corroboration doctrine carried into new Evidence Code (OCGA § 24-14-8) | Court: Applied Threatt corroboration standard, explaining the statutory provision carried over and was controlling |
| Constitutional sufficiency of evidence (Due Process) | Foster: Evidence insufficient to meet Jackson v. Virginia standard | State: Cited independent corroborating evidence and admissions | Held: Evidence also met Jackson standard; convictions supported beyond a reasonable doubt |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (right to proceed pro se)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency of the evidence under due process)
- Threatt v. State, 293 Ga. 549 (2013) (slight, independent corroboration of accomplice testimony may suffice)
- Parkerson v. State, 265 Ga. 438 (1994) (post- and pre-offense conduct may establish participation)
- Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369 (1993) (operation of law vacating certain felony-murder counts)