146 N.E.3d 408
Mass.2020Background
- Class action brought by incarcerated individuals (and those civilly committed) alleging defendants failed to protect them from grave COVID-19 risk in prisons and jails and were deliberately indifferent to that risk.
- Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief under G. L. c. 231A and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to reduce the incarcerated population, change confinement/medical arrangements, and force use of parole, medical parole, furloughs, commutations, and the Governor’s emergency powers.
- Prior related decision: court denied plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction and transferred the case for final adjudication.
- The Governor moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim (and lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction); the parole board moved to dismiss in part.
- The Supreme Judicial Court allowed the Governor’s motion to dismiss in full and allowed the parole board’s motion only with respect to claims by persons civilly committed under G. L. c. 123, § 35; the remainder of the parole‑board claims survived the motion to dismiss.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Governor is a proper defendant and may be ordered to use clemency/emergency powers | Foster: Governor refused to exercise near‑plenary clemency/emergency powers to reduce population and thus should be compelled | Governor: Declaratory relief under G. L. c. 231A excludes the Governor; courts may not compel the Governor to exercise clemency or direct how to use emergency powers | Dismissed — Governor cannot be sued under c.231A here and court will not order him to exercise clemency or dictate emergency actions |
| Whether plaintiffs can sue Governor based on failure to act (respondeat superior) | Foster: Governor’s inaction caused a failure to reduce population and remedy conditions | Governor: Liability cannot be premised on omission or vicarious/respondeat superior theories; no direct unconstitutional affirmative act by Governor alleged | Dismissed — claims premised on Governor’s failure to act are not actionable |
| Whether parole board may be ordered to exercise statutory parole/medical‑parole authority to reduce COVID risk | Foster: Parole board failed to use statutory powers (expedite hearings, grant medical parole, consider COVID risk) and was deliberately indifferent to inmate health | Parole board: Court equity cannot require actions beyond statutory authority; scope of relief limited by statute | Survived — plaintiffs plausibly alleged deliberate indifference and the court may, if constitutional violation proved, order the parole board to exercise its statutory authority; motion to dismiss denied as to these claims |
| Whether parole board liable for confinement of persons civilly committed under G. L. c. 123, § 35 | Foster: Civilly committed persons are being held in correctional facilities in violation of due process | Parole board: (implicitly) not the proper target for this claim or plaintiffs do not press it | Dismissed — plaintiffs do not oppose dismissal of the § 35 claim; parole board motion allowed as to those plaintiffs |
Key Cases Cited
- Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623 (2008) (standard for accepting factual allegations on a motion to dismiss)
- Milton v. Commonwealth, 416 Mass. 471 (1993) (declaratory‑judgment statute does not apply to Governor and Council)
- Horton v. Attorney Gen., 269 Mass. 503 (1929) (discussion of judicial power to declare constitutional limits)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (no vicarious liability for high‑level officials absent personal involvement)
- McCarthy v. Governor, 471 Mass. 1008 (2015) (equitable powers constrained by statute and constitution)
- Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Chief Justice of the Trial Court, 484 Mass. 431 (2020) (reference to "sufficiently compelling" circumstances for early relief)
- Good v. Commissioner of Correction, 417 Mass. 329 (1994) (Commissioner as proper party where he can prevent harm)
- Richardson v. Sheriff of Middlesex County, 407 Mass. 455 (1990) (parole board as a logical party to effectuate population‑reduction remedies)
- LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, 475 Mass. 757 (2016) (courts presume public officials will comply with declaratory/mandamus orders)