Fort Myer Constr. Co. v. Briscoe, 298 A.3d 770

Carroll D. Briscoe was a Fort Myer division superintendent who reviewed and approved employee timesheets; employee Kendra Ginyard (a Black woman) complained she was removed from a Sunday shift and replaced by a white male.
Briscoe contacted scheduler Paolo Spada; after their discussion Spada signed a timesheet showing Ginyard worked the Sunday though she had not; Fort Myer fired Briscoe and Ginyard and suspended Spada one day.
Briscoe applied for unemployment benefits; a claims examiner allowed benefits but Fort Myer appealed to the OAH claiming gross misconduct.
The ALJ credited Spada’s testimony that Briscoe directed him to sign the ticket, found Briscoe committed simple (but not gross) misconduct, citing lack of significant harm, isolation of the incident, no personal benefit, and Briscoe’s motivation to avoid a discrimination complaint.
The court remanded for clarification whether Briscoe acted to protect the employer; on remand the ALJ again found Briscoe directed the signing, credited that he feared discrimination claims and had seen supervisors resolve similar complaints by paying employees, and reaffirmed simple-misconduct disqualification.
The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed: it deferred to the ALJ’s credibility findings, held the facts did not support gross misconduct, but did support a finding of intentional or reckless substantial disregard (simple misconduct). Judge McLeese concurred in part and dissented as to simple misconduct.

Issue	Briscoe's Argument	Fort Myer’s Argument	Held
Whether Briscoe’s conduct constituted gross misconduct (complete disqualification)	He acted to protect Fort Myer from a discrimination complaint and lacked the extreme culpability required for gross misconduct	He directed falsification/attempted misappropriation of funds and therefore committed gross misconduct	Not gross misconduct; ALJ’s findings (no significant operational harm, isolated incident, no personal benefit, remedial motive) foreclose gross-misconduct finding
Whether Briscoe committed simple misconduct (partial disqualification)	He did not commit misconduct at all (argued belatedly on remand)	He knowingly or recklessly directed a subordinate to falsify a timesheet, substantially disregarding employer duties	Simple misconduct affirmed: credited evidence shows intentional or reckless substantial disregard of duties and attempted misappropriation
Whether Briscoe’s belated challenge to the simple-misconduct finding was procedurally barred	He had not cross-appealed earlier but sought to challenge simple-misconduct after remand	Fort Myer argued Briscoe failed to preserve the challenge (no timely cross-petition)	Court exercised discretion to consider the belated challenge (no timely objection by Fort Myer, remand altered record, legal question reviewed de novo)

Tyler v. George Washington Med. Fac. Assocs., 75 A.3d 211 (D.C. 2013) (standard for misconduct and statutory humanitarian purpose limits broad application)
Scott v. Behavioral Rsch. Assocs., Inc., 43 A.3d 925 (D.C. 2012) (heightened showing required to sustain gross misconduct)
Lynch v. Masters Sec., 126 A.3d 1125 (D.C. 2015) (distinguishing simple misconduct and related principles)
Gilmore v. Atl. Servs. Grp., 17 A.3d 558 (D.C. 2011) (legal questions reviewed de novo)
Kinard v. United States, 416 A.2d 1232 (D.C. 1980) (factfinder may credit parts of testimony and reject others; discussion of falsus in uno)
Brown v. Hawk One Sec., Inc., 3 A.3d 1142 (D.C. 2010) (example of upheld gross-misconduct finding)