Foremost Insurance Company Grand Rapids Michigan v. Guillen, 3:22-cv-05477

On September 16, 2021, defendants’ car was struck by an uninsured, intoxicated driver in Vancouver, WA; EDR data and the police report show high speed and at least two impacts seconds apart, with one impact about 4 seconds after the first.
Foremost insured the defendants: PIP $10,000 per person; UMBI $100,000 per person / $300,000 per occurrence; both coverages defined on a "per accident" basis.
Defendants sought PIP and UMBI benefits; Foremost opened and paid PIP but later maintained UMBI exposure covered only a single accident.
Defendants submitted witness declarations and EDR/brake data suggesting gaps and changes in braking/acceleration between impacts; Foremost relies on continuity and lack of regained control to treat the events as one accident.
Procedurally, both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment (Plaintiff: one accident; Defendants: two accidents and estoppel/waiver); the court denied both motions and denied plaintiff’s motion to strike certain declarations because genuine disputes of material fact remain.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Number of accidents (UMBI)	Events were a single, continuous proximate cause (one accident).	Collisions were separate occurrences; evidence (witnesses, EDR) shows time for control/decision between impacts (two or three accidents).	Denied summary judgment for both: genuine dispute whether impacts share one proximate cause or multiple causes; fact for jury.
Waiver (PIP payment)	PIP payment does not constitute waiver of Foremost’s right to contest number of accidents under UMBI.	Payment of PIP based on a two-accident assessment constitutes waiver of right to contest number of accidents.	Denied summary judgment: waiver requires unequivocal, knowing relinquishment of a right; factual inquiry for jury.
Estoppel / bad-faith estoppel	Foremost can assert defenses that tortfeasor could assert; no estoppel.	Foremost’s earlier conduct/statements induced reliance and estops it from later denying multiple accidents.	Denied summary judgment: estoppel requires clear, cogent, convincing evidence (or bad faith showing); material factual disputes remain.
Motion to strike declarations	Declarations are redundant/conflicting and Hubbard lacks reconstruction expertise.	Declarations are admissible non-pleading evidence; credibility/weight are for the trier of fact.	Denied: Rule 12(f) applies only to pleadings; credibility and conflicts raise factual issues for the jury.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment standard).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (genuine-dispute and evidence-weight rules for summary judgment).
Transcon. Ins. Co. v. Wash. Pub. Utils. Districts' Util. Sys., 111 Wn.2d 452 (1988) (number of accidents depends on number of underlying causes).
Greengo v. Public Emples. Mut. Ins. Co., 135 Wn.2d 799 (1998) (separate proximate causes support separate accidents).
Pemco Mut. Ins. Co. v. Utterback, 91 Wn. App. 764 (1998) (continuity and lack of regained control may make multiple impacts a single accident).
Truck Ins. Exch. v. Rohde, 49 Wn.2d 465 (1956) (single proximate, uninterrupted event treated as one accident).
Saunders v. Lloyd's of London, 113 Wn.2d 330 (1989) (waiver requires knowing, intentional relinquishment; standards explained).
Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Butler, 118 Wn.2d 383 (1992) (bad-faith estoppel elements and presumption of harm).
Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970 (2010) (Rule 12(f) limited to pleadings).
Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966 (2010) (evidence supporting summary judgment must show facts that can be proved through admissible evidence).