Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Roberson
25 A.3d 110
| Md. | 2011Background
- Maureen Roberson filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy, listed Ford as creditor, and kept paying the vehicle payments on time.
- Roberson did not reaffirm the debt in her Chapter 7 case, and Ford repossessed the vehicle after the discharge.
- Roberson then filed Chapter 13 to seek return of the car and damages for alleged wrongful repossession.
- Ford relied on an ipso facto default clause in the Maryland Simple Interest Vehicle Retail Installment Contract to repossess upon bankruptcy.
- The dispute centers on whether CLEC permits repossession based solely on bankruptcy filing when the debtor otherwise remains current and has not reaffirmed.
- The Maryland Bankruptcy Court certified the legal question to the Court of Appeals under the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May a secured creditor repossess a vehicle solely for bankruptcy filing under CLEC? | Roberson argues insecurity cannot justify repossession under CLEC. | Ford argues CLEC allows repossession when debtor files bankruptcy and is insecure. | Yes, under CLEC, only acceleration is prohibited; repossession is allowed. |
| Do CLEC and OPEC prohibit only acceleration or also repossession when insecure? | Roberson contends both acceleration and repossession are prohibited by CLEC/OPEC. | Ford contends CLEC/OPEC prohibit only acceleration, not repossession. | CLEC/OPEC prohibit only acceleration; RISA prohibits repossession when insecure. |
| Relation between CLEC/OPEC and RISA when debtor files bankruptcy and does not reaffirm? | Roberson relies on Biggus to read old law into CLEC/OPEC to protect debtors. | Ford relies on exclusive operation of CLEC/OPEC and confirms insecurity-only acceleration rule. | CLEC/OPEC operate independently from RISA; Biggus is superseded by 1993 amendments. |
Key Cases Cited
- Biggus v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 328 Md. 188 (Md. 1992) (held CLEC could be elected but not read to preclude all RISA protections)
- Proctor v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 412 Md. 691 (Md. 2010) (presumption of legislature acting with knowledge of existing law)