Ford Motor Co. v. Johnson
2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 9170
| Tex. App. | 2015Background
- On April 16, 2014 the Johnsons sued Ford in Dallas County for strict liability and negligence from a 2012 automobile accident in Crockett County, alleging venue was proper because Ford had a principal office in Dallas County.
- Ford moved to transfer venue to Collin County, denying a Dallas principal office and submitting an affidavit from Gregory Houston (Ford Sales & Marketing Manager) stating Ford’s Texas principal office is Ford’s Central Market Area Office in Collin County (Plano).
- The Johnsons responded with Dallas/Secretary of State business filings, excerpts of prior Ford pleadings in Dallas cases, and portions of Houston’s deposition to argue prima facie proof of a Dallas principal office and alleged judicial admissions by Ford.
- The trial court denied Ford’s motion to transfer; Ford appealed interlocutory under the venue statute.
- The court considered (1) whether it had jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal and (2) whether the Johnsons met their prima facie burden to show Dallas was a principal office; if not, whether Ford proved Collin County was proper.
- Court held the Johnsons failed to meet the prima facie burden for Dallas; Ford failed to prove Collin was the principal office as of the accrual date (July 26, 2012). Court reversed the denial of Ford’s motion and remanded for further proof/ proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction over interlocutory appeal | Johnsons argued this Court lacks jurisdiction and urged following Basic Energy precedent | Ford relied on this Court’s prior decision (Stouffer) interpreting §15.003(b) as allowing the appeal | Court rejected Johnsons’ cross-point and followed Stouffer; jurisdiction exists for the interlocutory appeal |
| Whether venue proper in Dallas (principal office) and transfer to Collin | Johnsons: Secretary of State/Dallas filings and prior Ford pleadings constitute prima facie proof (and judicial admissions) that Dallas was a principal office | Ford: plaintiffs must prove decision-makers with substantially equal authority are in Dallas; Houston affidavit shows Collin is Texas principal office, not Dallas | Court held Johnsons did not make prima facie showing; because Ford also failed to prove Collin was the principal office as of July 26, 2012, neither party established proper venue; remanded for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Stouffer, 420 S.W.3d 233 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014) (interpreting interlocutory appeal jurisdiction under amended venue statutes)
- In re Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 998 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. 1999) (test for establishing a corporation’s "principal office" for venue)
- Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1993) (prima facie venue proof is not subject to rebuttal/cross-examination)
- In re Transcon. Realty Inv’rs, 271 S.W.3d 270 (Tex. 2008) (discussion of domicile and effect of venue statute changes)
- Shamoun & Norman, LLP v. Yarto Int’l Grp., LP, 398 S.W.3d 272 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2012) (interpretation of §15.003(b) followed by Stouffer)
- Basic Energy Servs. GP, LLC v. Gomez, 398 S.W.3d 734 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010) (contrasting venue-jurisdiction interpretation rejected by Stouffer)
- Wilson v. Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, 886 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. 1994) (plaintiff’s choice of venue honored when initially proper)
- Childs v. Haussecker, 974 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. 1998) (venue/accident accrual date controls for certain venue facts)
- Ward v. Fairway Operating Co., 364 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1963) (older precedent on registered office/domicile and venue; court explained it is not controlling under current statute)