Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, 444 S.W.3d 616

Background

Plaintiffs (Castillo) sued Ford for product-design defects; after a 4-week trial the jury began deliberations and the case neared defense verdicts on liability.
Juror Cynthia Cortez initially resisted defense conclusions and later missed a day of deliberations, allegedly due to a child’s hospitalization; trial judge announced the absence.
During Cortez’s absence, plaintiff counsel Mark Cantu substantially reduced settlement demands (from $15M to under $2M) after earlier refusing to budge.
While deliberating the next morning the jury sent a note asking, “What is the maximum amount that can be awarded?” — a damages question later shown to have been sent by Cortez alone.
Ford’s counsel relied on the note (and on prior warnings from Cantu that he would demand $3M if a damages note were sent) to settle for $3M; Ford later refused to pay, sued for breach, and the jury found the settlement procured by fraud and mutual mistake.
Trial court verdict for Ford was reversed by the court of appeals on legal-sufficiency grounds; the Texas Supreme Court reversed that reversal, holding the circumstantial evidence legally sufficient and remanding for factual-sufficiency review.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff (Castillo) Argument	Defendant (Ford) Argument	Held
Legal sufficiency of circumstantial evidence of fraud inducing settlement	Evidence is mere coincidence, speculation (Cantu’s remark was a common negotiating trope) and insufficient to prove plaintiffs directed or knew the note was false	Circumstantial evidence shows collusion: Cantu’s specific pre-note prediction, Cortez’s absence/recess, sudden settlement concessions, juror testimony, and Cortez’s evasiveness	Court held evidence legally sufficient —reasonable juror could infer Cantu and Cortez colluded to send a fraudulent jury note inducing reliance by Ford
Whether Casteel invalidates the fraud theory because multiple theories exist in a single question	Casteel requires proving each alternative theory separately; here element phrased broadly so verdict is fatally ambiguous	Casteel applies only when one of the alternative theories is legally invalid; plaintiffs did not argue legal invalidity here	Court held Casteel not triggered; no presumption of harm because the element was legally valid in all theories
Whether a jury note asking a question can constitute a material misrepresentation	Note is only a question, not a factual statement, so cannot be a false representation	A question can imply material facts (jury deliberating damages, unanimity, intent to award maximum) and those implications were false	Court held the note’s implied factual assertions can be material misrepresentations when false
Justifiable reliance by Ford on the note	Ford could not justifiably infer unanimity or an imminent maximum verdict from a note	Ford reasonably relied on the note and surrounding circumstances (Cantu’s prediction, juror statements) without knowing the implications were false	Court held there was some evidence Ford did not know the implications were false and justifiably relied on them

Key Cases Cited

City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (framework for legal-sufficiency review of circumstantial evidence and permissible inferences)
Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. 2000) (presumed harm where broad-form question submits valid and invalid theories)
Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Reyna, 865 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1993) (limitations of circumstantial proof linking actor to wrongful conduct)
Joske v. Irvine, 44 S.W. 1059 (Tex. 1898) (insufficient circumstantial evidence where connection is mere conjecture)
Thompson v. Shannon, 9 Tex. 536 (Tex. 1853) (recognition that fraud claims often rely on circumstantial evidence)