Ford, A., Aplt. v. American States Ins.
Ford, A., Aplt. v. American States Ins. - No. 13 WAP 2016
Pa.Feb 22, 2017Background
- This is a dissent (Justice Donohue, joined by Justice Todd) in a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision addressing 75 Pa.C.S. § 1731 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL).
- Section 1731(b)–(c) prescribes exact written rejection forms for uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage that insurers must have the named insured sign; § 1731(c.1) requires the forms be printed on separate sheets, signed and dated, and provides that any rejection form that does not "specifically comply" is void.
- The Majority held that insurers may use non‑statutory forms so long as the form adequately conveys the substance of the statutorily prescribed language (substantial rather than specific compliance).
- The dissent argues the statute requires exact, specific compliance with the legislatively drafted language and that the Majority improperly rewrote the statute to allow de minimis variations.
- The dissent emphasizes statutory‑construction principles: follow unambiguous statutory text, give effect to every word (notably "specifically"), and not add language the legislature omitted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether insurers must use the exact statutory rejection language in § 1731(b)–(c) | Ford: Statute requires the insured to sign the precise legislatively drafted form; any deviation voids the rejection | American States: A form that conveys the same substance satisfies the statute; substantial compliance is sufficient | Majority: Substantial compliance acceptable; Dissent: § 1731 requires specific compliance and deviations render the form void |
| Whether § 1731(c.1)'s phrase "specifically comply" mandates exact wording | Ford: "Specifically" means exact, not permissive | American States: "Specifically" should not preclude minor non‑substantive changes | Held: Disagreement between Majority and dissent; dissent reads "specifically" to demand exactitude |
| Whether courts may allow grammatical or de minimis changes to prescribed forms | Ford: Only limited, expressly authorized grammatical change exists in § 1731(b.2); no similar authorization for (b)/(c) | American States: Minor changes that do not inject ambiguity are permissible | Dissent: Because legislature permitted grammatical change only in (b.1), no changes allowed to (b) and (c) forms |
| Appropriate judicial role in interpreting § 1731 | Ford: Court must apply plain statutory text and not rewrite statute | American States: Court can interpret to effectuate legislative purpose and allow practical flexibility | Dissent: Court must enforce plain text; permitting tinkering invites continued litigation over variations |
Key Cases Cited
- Mohamed v. Com., Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 40 A.3d 1186 (Pa. 2012) (if statutory language is unambiguous, court applies it without looking beyond the text)
- Mishoe v. Erie Ins. Co., 824 A.2d 1153 (Pa. 2003) (statutory words read in context; do not interpret in isolation)
- O'Rourke v. Department of Corr., 778 A.2d 1194 (Pa. 2001) (contextual reading of statutes)
- Shafer Elec. & Const. v. Mantia, 96 A.3d 989 (Pa. 2014) (court may not add language to a statute that legislature did not include)
- Commonwealth v. Johnson, 26 A.3d 1078 (Pa. 2011) (judicial restraint in adding statutory language)
- Johnson v. Lansdale Borough, 146 A.3d 696 (Pa. 2016) (interpretation must account for what statute says and omits)
- Kmonk‑Sullivan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 788 A.2d 955 (Pa. 2001) (statutory interpretation principles)
- Pantuso Motors, Inc. v. Corestates Bank, N.A., 798 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 2002) (give effect to every word of a statute)
- Am. Int’l Ins. Co. v. Vaxmonsky, 916 A.2d 1106 (Pa. Super. 2006) (distinguishing stricter scrutiny for § 1731 forms vs. other statutory waiver forms)