Foote v. Williams
Civil Action No. 2016-2530
| D.D.C. | Aug 31, 2017Background
- Lester Foote (Pennsylvania resident) purchased a Primerica life policy in 2002; Jane Williams was the Primerica agent and his cousin.
- After Foote married Sandra Foote in 2010, he completed a policy-change application at Williams’s Philadelphia home to add Sandra and retain one god-daughter as beneficiaries; Primerica requested clarification and Williams did not provide a written response.
- Williams visited Foote’s family in the District of Columbia on three occasions; during those visits she allegedly told Foote and Sandra that she had “taken care of” the beneficiary change and later told Sandra she would “be getting a lot of money soon.”
- Foote died in 2013; Primerica interpleaded the policy proceeds in Maryland and the plaintiff lost under the policy because written waivers from original beneficiaries were not obtained.
- Sandra Foote sued Williams in D.C. for negligence and negligent misrepresentation. Williams moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction; the court considered long-arm statute provisions and due-process minimum contacts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether D.C. long-arm subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(6) cover Williams’s conduct | Williams transacted business/contracted to supply services/contracted to insure affecting a D.C. resident by executing and submitting policy paperwork | Williams acted only in her corporate/agent capacity for Primerica from Pennsylvania, not individually transacting business in D.C. | Not covered; court held those prongs apply to persons who transact business or contract personally, not to employees acting solely in corporate capacity, so jurisdiction under (a)(1),(2),(6) fails |
| Whether subsection (a)(4) (tortious injury in D.C. caused by out-of-state act plus ‘plus factor’) applies | Williams’s acts caused injury in D.C.; plaintiff asserted (a)(4) as alternative | Williams lacks the required additional contacts (regular solicitation, persistent course, substantial revenue) with D.C. beyond the alleged tort | Not satisfied; plaintiff failed to show any independent “plus factor,” so (a)(4) does not support jurisdiction |
| Whether subsection (a)(3) (tortious injury in D.C. by an act or omission in D.C.) and due process are met for negligent misrepresentation | Misrepresentations allegedly made during Williams’s visits to D.C. caused plaintiff’s reliance and injury in D.C., satisfying (a)(3) and supporting jurisdiction | Williams’s visits were sporadic family visits unrelated to business; such isolated contacts do not show purposeful availment to satisfy due process | (Mixed) Court found (a)(3) satisfied for negligent misrepresentation on causation grounds but concluded Williams lacked the constitutionally required minimum contacts (purposeful availment) — overall personal jurisdiction in D.C. fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (interpreting § 13-423(a)(4) and requiring a separate "plus factor")
- GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts)
- Flocco v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 752 A.2d 147 (D.C. 2000) (individual employees cannot be sued under transacting-business prong for acts solely performed in corporate capacity)
- Helmer v. Doletskaya, 393 F.3d 201 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (both act and injury must occur in forum to satisfy (a)(3))
- Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (U.S. 1945) (minimum contacts and fair play due process standard)
- Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (U.S. 1958) (purposeful availment requirement)
- Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (U.S. 1985) (contacts must show deliberate and voluntary association with forum)